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ABSTRACT
Often times, policymakers develop legislation to increase the levels of
entrepreneurial activity. These policies exist at the federal, state and local levels as part of
economic development plans. This dissertation aims to offer information to policymakers
on the effectiveness of existing policies and to evaluate how entrepreneurial individuals
behave. There are three approaches taken in this dissertation. The first chapter presents a
natural experiment and utilizes a difference-in-difference-in-difference model to
investigate whether state level subsidies increased the health insurance take-up rate
among the self-employed. The findings suggest that, in fact, these types of subsidies did
increase the probability that a self-employed individual would be self-insured. The
second chapter presents a laboratory, economic experiment, conducted in the U.S. and
replicated in Brazil, which tests to see if entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial differ in
their financial risk aversion levels. The results supported that entrepreneurial subjects
were less risk averse than non-entrepreneurial subjects. Also, the subjects from the U.S.
sessions were more entrepreneurial than those from Brazil. The final chapter presents an
extension of the Ramsey model, a theoretical macroeconomic model. The model suggests
that higher levels of tax evasion lead to lower levels of capital and consumption in a
given economy at all points in time. Also, tax evasion leads to a decrease in government
revenue. Finally, the model predicts that tax evasion will have no impact on the long-term
economic growth rate, which is only determined by productivity growth.
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INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship is a driver of economic growth and is often included with labor,
capital and technology as a factor or production when developing models of economic
growth. This study will focus its efforts on presenting the implications of public policies
on the behavior and choices of entrepreneurs. This dissertation offers analyses of
experimental data, large microeconomic data sets and presents a theoretical
macroeconomic model. The objective is to show how public policies affect
entrepreneurship. Policies are not only important during the start-up phase of a business
but also during the growth and development of a venture. Entrepreneurship policies
should be all encompassing and should include efficient policies that help stimulate more
entrepreneurial activity, support existing entrepreneurial activity and discourage
inefficient activity. This dissertation hopes to provide more information for policy makers
about how certain policies affect the behavior and choices of entrepreneurs and potential
entrepreneurs.
Why is it important to dedicate an entire Economics dissertation to public policy
and entrepreneurship from so many different angles? The primary motivation for the
study was the often recognized relationship between entrepreneurship and economic
growth. The study of the correlation between entrepreneurship and growth dates back to
at least the 1930’s when Joseph Schumpeter wrote about it and discussed the relationship
between entrepreneurship and capitalism, among other subjects (1934). Entrepreneurship
is now one of the recognized factors of production and determinants of economic growth.
Entrepreneurs create markets, ideas, products, and employment, all of which contribute to
growth. They also create new ways to combine labor and capital to produce new or
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improved output. New business creation contributes to economic growth in many ways
including converting ideas into new economic activities, increasing market competition,
and creating a source for new employment and increased productivity (Kantis, Komori
and Ishida 2002). Empirically, those countries that have introduced more support for
entrepreneurship have experienced additional economic growth (Audretsch and Thorik
2000). It has been argued that entrepreneurship should be included in growth theory
because of its ability to incorporate human capital, knowledge externalities and
increasing returns to scale (Holcombe 1998).
However, looking at entrepreneurship and its effects on growth and development
does not supply sufficient information for policy makers on how to increase national
levels of entrepreneurial activity. Using the relationship between entrepreneurship and
economic growth as motivation, this dissertation takes the opportunity to look at specific
intersections between public policy and entrepreneurial activities.
One area where the federal and state level governments have supported the selfemployed and small business owners is by subsidizing health insurance costs and the first
chapter of this dissertation takes a closer look at the effects of state health insurance
subsidies on the choice of the self-employed to insure. It has been argued that one of the
driving factors in the rise of health insurance costs in the United States is the high level of
uninsured. Also, the take up rate among the self-employed is suggested to be lower than
that of wage-earners. Combining the relationship between uninsured and the cost of
health care with the strong effect that the self-employed have on the level of uninsured, it
becomes clear that policies effective at increasing the take up rate among the selfemployed are important in helping reduce the cost of health care. The federal government
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has tried to combat this since the implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which
allowed the self-employed to deduct a percentage of their health insurance costs from
their earnings. Subsequent federal policies followed and then around the year 2000, some
states began to subsidize the insurance costs for small business owners.
Many studies have been conducted to determine the effects of the federal policies,
or a combination of federal and state policies, on the take up rates among self-employed.
However, few studies have focused on the effects of only the state policies while
controlling for the changes in the federal policies. This information is very important for
policy makers to determine if the subsidies, deduction allowances and premium discounts
have effectively increased the take up rate, irrespective of the federal government efforts.
This is where the first section of this dissertation adds to the existing body of literature.
The study method includes a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach that helps
isolate the effects of the state subsidies from those of the federal policies. Another
important question that could be asked of the data is whether these subsidies encouraged
a higher level of self-employment in the states that implemented health insurance subsidy
programs, which is also investigated in the first chapter.
Another area where there is a debate about entrepreneurs and their behavior is
when addressing the question of whether entrepreneurs have different risk aversion levels
than non-entrepreneurs and if this difference in risk aversion is a driving factor in the
decision to become an entrepreneur. The discussion about the risk aversion levels of
entrepreneurs dates back to the late 1800s. At that time, many believed that a higher
propensity for risk taking was a primary characteristic function of an entrepreneur. This
discourse continued into the 1900s when Joseph Schumpeter began to question this
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proposition. He was not convinced that risk taking, primarily financial risk taking, was
necessarily an inherent behavioral characteristic of entrepreneurs. As this discussion
continued into the mid to late 1900s, a more formal manner of data collection, storage
and analysis became prevalent. Therefore, this principally theoretical discussion could
now begin to be tested empirically. Even as empirical methods improved and access to
data became easier, the disagreement continues. This discrepancy in the literature has
strong public policy implications. If a policy maker decides to subsidize start-up costs,
then only the people that are less risk averse will first take advantage of the subsidy.
Often times, it is argued that subsidizing this type of behavior will encourage inefficient
entry into the market. Only the less risk averse will take advantage of the subsidy and
these individuals often times are the ones willing to take further risks in order to ensure
their business is a success. If the subsidy is too high then it will certainly create a market
flooded with inefficient business owners who thought that the subsidy was high enough
to protect them against the risk of his or her business failing.
On the other hand, it could be the case that potential entrepreneurs are no less
financially risk averse than those who plan to remain wage-earners. If this scenario holds
true then a subsidy that protects potential entrepreneurs from financial risk will not
encourage entrepreneurial entry. Therefore, it is an inefficient use of tax dollars. Not only
is it important to note whether there are differences in risk preference when deciding to
subsidize start-up costs but also when deciding on subsidizing innovative activities for
existing businesses. The same argument exists here as before. Information on the risk
preferences of entrepreneurs gives legislators the ability to better target subsidies and
other support programs for entrepreneurs. If entrepreneurial ventures are not innovating
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and the government wants to increase their innovative capacity then information as to
whether innovation is not taking place because of the hesitation of entrepreneurs to take
financial risk is imperative.
The second chapter of this dissertation examines whether there is a difference in
the financial risk taking behaviors among more and less entrepreneurial individuals. This
is done so by employing an economic experiment. This is where this paper adds to the
literature. As the experimental economic literature is rich with risk studies, very few of
these studies focus on determining if there is a difference in the risk preferences of
entrepreneurs versus non-entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial people versus nonentrepreneurial. The information on the risk preferences of entrepreneurs is also useful
when designing policies to discourage informal economic activities. If an entrepreneur is
less risk averse then it may take high penalties and a high probability of being caught to
discourage them from participating, at least in part, in the informal sector.
This is where the final chapter of the dissertation comes in and presents a
theoretical macroeconomic model that shows the economic impacts of tax evasion. A
self-employed individual can more easily evade taxes by underreporting income and
falsifying deductions. This ease of tax evasion is one of the often cited reasons why some
individuals choose entrepreneurship over wage earning. This chapter also takes some
time to present literature on the state of informal economics throughout the world.
This dissertation takes a wide range of approaches in modeling and empirically
analyzing the behaviors of entrepreneurs. There are two empirical chapters; one which
uses a large household level data set and the other employs an experiment to generate
new data. As both of the first two chapters include a brief theoretical explanation of what
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is expected to be seen in the results or in the real world, the final chapter employs the
Ramsey model to explain the effects of tax evasion. Hopefully, some of the findings in
this dissertation can be used to inform policy makers that are either interested in
developing new policies to encourage entrepreneurial activity or determine if previously
implemented policies have had the intended effects.
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CHAPTER 1
STATE HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES AND THE SELF-EMPLOYED

Abstract
Many of the studies addressing the effectiveness of health insurance subsidies on the
take-up rate of the self-employed have focused on either federal policies, such as TRA86
and OECSA, or the federal policies in combination with state policies. We are interested
in isolating the effects of the state subsidy programs on take up rates. We are also
interested in determining whether state health insurance subsidies have increased the
probability that an individual would choose to become self-employed. Using a differencein-difference-in-difference approach, this natural experiment isolates the effects of the
state policies from the federal policy effects by comparing a group of states that subsidize
the cost of health insurance with a group of similar states that have not implemented such
policies. We find that a self-employed individual in the treatment states was more likely
to be covered by private insurance after the state subsidized the cost of health insurance.
However, we do not find that the subsidies increased the probability that an individual
would choose to become self-employed.
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Health insurance concerns
Two of the driving issues in the recent debate over a public health program are the
number of uninsured and the high cost of health insurance. In 2009, over 50.6 million
people in the U.S. were without health insurance (DeNava-Walt, Proctor and Smith
2009). The average health insurance premium for a family of four in 2009 was $13,770
and $5,049 for a single individual, as reported by the Kaiser/HRET (2010) annual survey.
These statistics exist in spite of policy changes intended to reduce the number of
uninsured over the past 20 years. During the health care debate, tax credits that lowered
premiums were proposed as an effective way to increase demand for health insurance. If
adverse selection is present then individuals with less health risks choose not to
participate in the insurance markets. Lowering the premium would increase the pool of
“healthy” purchasers of health insurance. However, some studies have found that adverse
selection did not exist in certain health insurance markets (Swartz and Garnick 2000). If
this describes current health insurance markets, lower premiums will not attract healthier
people into the pool. However, by making insurance more affordable, lower premiums
can increase the take up rate even in the absence of adverse selection. Health insurance
subsidies have been found to have a significant effect on the take up rate of the uninsured
(Heim and Lurie 2009). Hence, before any new subsidies are implemented, it seems
appropriate to determine the efficiency of previous policies.
This paper will focus specifically on the impact of state health insurance subsidies
on the take up rate for privately insured self-employed. Because the insurance programs
used in this analysis offer subsidies for the purchase of private insurance, we did not
include total insurance coverage rates, only the effects on the probability of being
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privately insured. The self-employed sector of the population is a force in low rates of
insurance coverage. In 2004, 77.9% of adults in employed families were covered as
opposed to 47.9% of adults in self-employed families (Selden 2009). In Selden’s study, a
self-employed family includes the self-employed person, his or her spouse and other
family members living in the same household. An employed family was defined as a
family where the head of the household was employed but not self-employed. It was
estimated that, using Schedule C filing as a proxy for self-employment, an increase of 5%
in the number of self-employed could translate into a 1% increase in the uninsured
population (Cebula 2006).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) allowed self-employed individuals to
deduct 25% of the costs of health insurance from their taxable income on their federal
income tax returns. The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplement Act
(OCESA) of 1998 gradually increased this deductibility, until finally in 2003 the selfemployed were able to deduct 100% of their health insurance expenditures. Since these
changes, some states have followed suit and implemented their own form of health
insurance subsidies designed to lower the cost of health insurance for the self-employed
and small businesses. Many current health insurance subsidy studies focus on the federal
and state policies simultaneously or they consider only the effects of the federal policies.
Our approach is distinguished from the standard difference-in-difference approach (DID).
By controlling for the effects of the federal policy changes, this paper uses a differencein-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach. In this way we isolate the effects of state
insurance subsidies on the self-employed. The three differences are whether the person is
self-employed (1), living in a state that implemented a subsidy (2) after the subsidy was
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implemented (3). I test the effectiveness of such state policies by addressing two research
questions. First, have the state health insurance subsidies increased the likelihood that a
self-employed individual will purchase health insurance? And second, have state health
insurance subsidies increased the likelihood that a person will become self-employed?
Health insurance subsidies and take-up rates
As the price of a good decreases (increases) we expect the quantity demanded of
that good to increase (decrease) by an amount that depends on the price elasticity of
demand. It is important for policy makers to be aware of the price elasticity of demand
for health insurance when subsidizing the purchase of this good. Many studies find that
the price elasticity for insurance is very low which leads to small increases in take-up
rates when insurance premia fall. However, there is no consensus on the true value of the
take-up rate.
Evidence for the price elasticity of insurance take-up is mixed. Feldstein and
Friedman (1977) found a large impact of the price of insurance on the amount of
insurance purchased, using simulations. Holmer (1984) finds a price elasticity of -0.16
and believes that it is important to determine why earlier studies find dramatically
different results. Holmer asserts that the previous studies used the expected utility model
to explain how people made choices of health insurance plans under uncertainty and they
overestimated the price elasticity. He proposes that the theoretical framework for viewing
this choice behavior could be Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory as
opposed to the conventional expected utility model. Prospect theory, as it relates to the
purchase of insurance, asserts that insurance is not a way to reduce uncertainty but that
people insure from a gain perspective (P. Schneider 2004). Therefore, people may choose
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not to purchase insurance because they expect to pay less for their health risk than a
deviation from the optimal risk level. Hence, individuals have a risk preference with
respect to losses and will only insure if the loss will occur with certainty and not because
they are risk averse as predicted by expected utility theory (P. Schneider 2004).
Shoemaker (1982) and Slovic and Lichtenstein (1983) have shown the empirical
inadequacy of the expected utility model. More recently, Gruber and Washington (2005)
estimated a price elasticity closer to -0.02, which is even lower than Holmer’s estimate,
suggesting little response to changes in the price of insurance. Their study focused on
employee premiums and they concluded that subsidies are not a cost effective way to
increase coverage.
These elasticities measure the responsiveness of insurance purchases to changes
in the price of insurance. Gruber and Levitt (2000) evaluated a number of different tax
policies and their potential impact on the number of uninsured. They conclude that even
the most effective tax policy they evaluated would cost about $40 billion per year and
would only cover about 30% of the uninsured. This is similar to Blumberg et al.’s (2001)
conclusion that subsidies will have to be very large to induce uninsured workers to
purchase insurance. Other studies have actually tried to estimate the effects of specific
subsidy programs on the take-up of health insurance. Long and Marquis (2002) found
that decreasing insurance premiums to only $10 would have a small impact and one-third
of eligible adults would still remain uninsured. They used a conditional logit model to
explain the choice of health insurance status including the existence of subsidies and
public health insurance options. It was interesting that over 37% of the individuals below
the poverty line were not aware of the public options that were available to them.

11

Marquis et al. (2004) showed that a 50% subsidy would only reduce the number of
uninsured by 4-8%, specifically focusing on the impact of a state subsidy package in
California. Auerbach and Ohri (2006) suggested that a 50% subsidy would only increase
the purchased coverage by 4.4%. This study specifically focused on non-group health
insurance.
Approximately 30% of the uninsured in 2009 had a household income of less than
$25,000 (DeNava-Walt, Proctor and Smith 2009). Given this information, the behavior of
low income households in response to a subsidy is important. Thomas (1994), using data
from the 1977 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey, found that a person’s income
must rise above 125% of the poverty line before the family is likely to purchase
insurance. Thomas concluded that only families above the poverty line would be likely to
purchase health insurance. This could be a result of public programs, such as Medicaid,
that are available and act as substitutes for private insurance.
In sum, many of the most recent studies suggest that investing tax dollars in
subsidizing health insurance would have a very small impact in the likelihood that an
individual will decide to purchase insurance. However, policy makers continue to push
for tax credit and deductions to cover the cost of insurance at both the federal and state
levels.
Health insurance and self-employment
The previous studies reviewed here did not focus specifically on the impact of the
health insurance subsidies on the self-employed but on the general effects of health
insurance subsidies. Using CPS data and employing a DID approach, Gruber and Poterba
(1994) took a closer look at the evidence from the self-employed and conclude that the

12

self-employed are extremely responsive to changes in the cost of health insurance. Their
findings suggest that a 1% increase in the cost of insurance coverage reduces the
probability that a self-employed household will insure by 1.8%. An open question is
whether the self-employed are as responsive to a price decrease as they are to a price
increase. If this is not necessarily the case then it lends support to the prospect theory
view for the purchase of health insurance by the self-employed.
Studies are inconclusive regarding the question of the effects of the subsidy on the
behavior of the self-employed. Heim and Lurie (2009) find that changing the price of
insurance had a moderate effect on the number of self-employed individuals who
purchase insurance and the amount of insurance that they purchase, estimating a take-up
rate of about -0.3. A much higher elasticity was estimated by Seldon (2009), -1.9, which
implies that an increase in tax subsidies will increase the coverage among the selfemployed significantly. His simulations of responses to the federal and state increases in
subsidies after 1996 found increases of 1.1 million persons in the number of selfemployed with private coverage in 2004. Given recent increases in insurance premiums,
subsidies have to increase by at least the same amount to be effective in reducing the after
tax price of health insurance for the self-employed. On the other hand, Gumus and Regan
(2009) concluded that the self-employed respond very little to reductions in the cost of
health insurance.
Besides the take-up rate, it is important to identify whether such subsidies will
entice potential self-employed individuals to start their own business. After examining
the impacts of the TRA86 and the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93),
Moore (2003) found that the reforms (including subsidies) had no significant effect on
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the decision to become self-employed. The self-employed have a significant impact on
the percentage of persons not covered by health insurance (Cebula 2006). It is important
to identify whether the potential self-employed individuals would respond to incentives
such as tax deductions, credit or other forms of subsidies by deciding to start their own
business. On the margin, these policies reduce the cost of self-employment. The
opportunity to obtain lower cost health insurance could tip an uninsured wage earner
toward entrepreneurship. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1996) found insured wage-earners to be no
less likely to start their own business than their uninsured counterparts.
Why would we want to subsidize health insurance for the self-employed?
Conventional economic theory tells us that when health insurance is subsidized
for the self-employed then more self-employed individuals will purchase health
insurance. This paper asks whether this is the case and whether state health insurance
subsidies have increased the likelihood that workers will choose to become selfemployed. The proponents for such subsidies insist that they will decrease the number of
self-employed that are uninsured and it will increase the number of potential selfemployed individuals that start their own business. Also, if the goal of health policy is to
decrease the percentage of uninsured in the population then concentrating part of their
effort on the self-employed proves to be valuable due to the large percentage of selfemployed which is uninsured.
Besides reducing the percentage of uninsured, why else should we be concerned
with supporting the self-employed? The self-employed sector of the population is a
driving force for growth and innovation. Many researchers suggest that small and
medium-sized businesses have the capacity to be very innovative (Nooteboom 1994;
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Rothwell and Dodgson 1994; Van Dijk, et al. 1997; Dahl and Moreau 2002). The selfemployed are only one type of entrepreneurs. Individuals which are wage-earners could
also behave in an entrepreneurial manner if that type of behavior is supported by the
organization. Self-employed are quite often regarded as unemployed as opposed to
entrepreneurs. But for the purpose of this chapter, a self-employed individual is aligned
with an entrepreneur. The study of the correlation between entrepreneurship and growth
dates back to at least when Joseph Schumpeter (1934) wrote about it and discussed the
relationship between entrepreneurship and capitalism, among other subjects.
Entrepreneurship is now one of the recognized factors of production and determinants of
economic growth. Entrepreneurs create markets, ideas, products, and employment, all of
which contribute to growth. New business creation contributes to economic growth in
many ways including converting ideas into new economic activities, increasing market
competition, and creating a source for new employment and increased productivity
(Kantis, Komori and Ishida 2002). Empirically, those countries that have introduced more
support for entrepreneurship have experienced additional economic growth (Audretsch
and Thorik 2000). It has been argued that entrepreneurship should be included in growth
theory because of its ability to incorporate human capital, knowledge externalities and
increasing returns to scale (Holcombe 1998). Finally the self-employed (entrepreneurs)
are some of the most innovative actors in society and innovation is key for the recovery
of certain economic sectors (Bosma and Levie 2009). Therefore, it is in policymakers’
best interest to create legislation that encourages growth of start-up businesses.
There are many other barriers, besides the cost of health insurance, to starting
your own business including financial risk, start-up costs, capital investment, payroll
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taxes, etc. With all of these other factors, lowering the price of health insurance may not
play a major role in the decision to become self-employed. If start-up costs are possible
barriers to entry then researchers have asked if subsidizing these costs should encourage
more self-employment. High start-up costs reduce the rate at which new businesses are
started (Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides 2001). But subsidizing entry may reduce
the revealed differences between less efficient and more efficient firms, which may lead
to inefficient firms entering the market (Kösters 2009).
State health insurance subsidies
Not every state has implemented subsidies of health insurance premiums for small
businesses. And no two state policies are exactly alike. Among some of the policy
differences are the sizes of small businesses that are eligible to receive the subsidy,
employee income restrictions, level of the subsidy, date of implementation, minimum
employee participation, and required employer contribution. Table 1 presents some
information on the general restrictions and inclusions for each state with subsidies that
were included in our analysis.
In the Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit program (Arizona), for a small business to
be eligible to receive the subsidy, they must have had between two and 25 full-time
employees during the last year, not offered health insurance for the previous six months,
and been operating in Arizona for the past year (Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit
2010). Also, small businesses can participate in the program for a maximum of three
years and can only change insurance providers on the day of annual renewal. The
Insurance Coverage Affordability and Relief to small Employers (ICARE) in Kentucky
began in 2007. As of now, they are not accepting new applications but are accepting
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renewals. Maine’s DirigoChoice plan of 2008 offers programs to small businesses with 250 employees and also has an option for sole proprietors. Maine offers
three different plans for its enrollees with different deductibles but identical benefits.
The proponents of the Working Families and Small Business Health Coverage
Act of Maryland hope that over 100,000 uninsured will gain coverage (Working Families
& Small Business Health Coverage Act 2010). To be eligible a small business must have
only 2-9 full-time employees, have average wages below $50,000 and have not offered
insurance to their employees for the past 12 months (Working Families & Small Business
Health Coverage Act 2010). The self-employed in Massachusetts have to meet certain
eligibility requirements to be covered by the Insurance Partnership including but not
limited to: be between the age of 19-64, live in Massachusetts, have a family income that
is no more than the standard income and, of course, be self-employed (Insurance
Partnership for Employees 2010). Insure Montana is a state funded program that can
assist small business owners in two ways. One is through the Purchasing Pool Program
(for businesses who do not currently offer a group plan) and the other is through the Tax
Credit Program (for businesses who do currently offer coverage) (Insure Montana 2010).
The State Coverage Insurance program in New Mexico covers small businesses with 50
or less employees, including self-employed sole proprietors. The annual benefits are
capped at $100,000 and are targeted towards the uninsured (State Coverage Insurance
Frequently Asked Questions 2010). Finally, CoverTN is a low-cost coverage plan for
small businesses and individuals in Tennessee. Employers must: be located in Tennessee,
have 50 or fewer full-time employees with 50% of them earning less than $55,000 per
year, pay one third of the premium, and have not offered coverage in the past six months
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(CoverTN Eligibility 2010). Thus, most state plans target small firms whose employees
do not earn high wages and do not already have access to employer provided health
coverage.

State

Table 1. Health Insurance Subsidy Characteristics by State
Name of
Size of
Year
Level of subsidy
Program
employer
Started
Lesser of: $1,000 for each
employee (single coverage);
$3,000 for each employee
(family coverage); or 50% of
annual premium
$3,000 for each employee
(family coverage); or 50% of
annual premium
$40 per employee/month;
Employee with a high-cost
condition - $60/month

Arizona

Health Insurance
Premium Tax Credit

2-25 eligible
employees

2006

Kentucky

ICARE

2-25 eligible
employees

2007

Maine

Dirigo Choice

2-50 eligible
employees

2008

Premium discounts and costsharing reductions

Maryland

Working Families
and Small Business
Health Coverage Act

2-9 eligible
employees

2008

Lesser of: $2,000 for each
employee; or 50% of the
premium

Massachusetts

Insurance Partnership

2-50 eligible
employees

2008

$33.33/month (individual);
$66.66/month (couple or one
adult/one child);
$83.33/month (family)

Montana

Insure Montana

2-9 eligible
employees

2005

Premium assistance

New Mexico

State Coverage
Insurance (SCI)

1-50 eligible
employees

2005

Employers pay $75, and
enrollees pay up to $35
depending on income

Tennessee

CoverTN

1-50 eligible
employees

2008

Premium discounts

*Source: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Data as of February 2010 and can be accessed at
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparereport.jsp?rep=4&cat=7

Data and empirical approach
I used data from the 2002 and 2009 Current Population Survey (CPS), with 2002
representing the before policy year and 2009 representing the after policy year. The
March Supplement asks Health Insurance related questions and was used for this study.
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The data are collected for each individual in the household but the labor data is only
collected for those15 years or older (Technical Documentation Current Population
Survey 2009). The disabled and those not between the ages of 19 and 64 were dropped
from the sample.
To answer the two questions of interest, we exploit a natural experiment. The
treatment group consists of states that have implemented a subsidy for the purchase of
health insurance by small businesses or the self-employed. These states are Arizona,
Kentucky, Maine, New Mexico, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana and Tennessee. The
control group consists of states that have not implemented such policies but are similar to
the treatment states with regards to their median income and industry mix. The control
states are Colorado, West Virginia, Ohio, Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, North
Dakota and Alabama. Table 1A, in the Appendix, presents some comparative statistics
between the treatment and control states.
Table 2 presents variable descriptions and the summary statistics. The income
variable was reported as a continuous variable representing the amount of income earned
in the previous year. The occupation variable was reported by choosing from one of
eleven different categories of occupations. The years of education variable was estimated
using the information given in the data. Table 2A, in the Appendix, shows the conversion
from the variable reported in the data to the form of the variable used in the analysis. In
the sample, an individual was considered married if they reported themselves as married
with civilian spouse present or married with armed forces spouse present.
A person in the sample was considered self-employed if they reported themselves
as self-employed incorporated or self-employed not incorporated as their class of worker.
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Table 2. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics
Variable Name
Private Insurance
age
male
married
White
Black
Native
Asian
Hispanic
income
education
kids
self_employed
subsidy
after
management
professional
service
sales
administrative

farming, fishing and forestry

construction

maintenance
production
transportation
armed forces

Description
Mean
Indicator Variable for having private
.780
insurance
Age in years
40.356
male = 1
.472
married = 1
.619
White, Non-hispanic
.721
Black, Non-hispanic
.100
American Indian or Aleut Eskimo
.010
Asian or Pacific Islander
.042
Hispanic
.120
Annual Income from Previous Year in
$39,096
Dollars
Number of years of education
13.615
Number of children
.914
Indicator variable equal to 1 if self.083
employed
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
.458
subsidy state
Indicator variable where before policy
.462
(2002) = 0 and after = 1
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
management, business or financial
.153
occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
.198
professional or related occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
.073
service occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in sales
.087
and related occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
office and administrative support
.123
occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
farming, fishing or forestry
.002
occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
construction and extraction
.026
occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
installation maintenance and repair
.061
occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
.066
production occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
transportation and material moving
.040
occupations
Indicator variable equal to 1 if in
.019
Armed Forces occupations
Source: 2002 and 2009 Current Population Survey
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Std. Dev.
.414
11.944
.499
.486
.448
.300
.102
.201
.325
$49,222
2.860
1.123
.275
.498
.499
.360
.399
.261
.283
.328

.047

.160

.240
.248
.197
.136

The variable representing the number of children only takes into account children that
were never married and were under the age of 18 at the time of completing the survey.
The theoretical model that motivated the empirical model to answer the first
question of interest is below. The data was available to test most of the theoretical model
less the health

status variable. Based on the consensus in the literature it is assumed that are older,
married, with kids and higher incomes would be more likely to purchase private health
insurance. Also, it was important to control for the type of occupation because
individuals employed in occupations with higher risk of injury would be more likely to
purchase health insurance. Missing in the estimation is a measure of health status which
was not available in the data. A presence of adverse selection in the health insurance
market would imply that less healthy individuals are more likely to purchase health
insurance.
I employed a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach using a logit
model. This type of model is often used for policy analysis, specifically to determine the
effectiveness of a policy. Once a policy has been implemented for a number of years and
has been given the opportunity to take effect the DD or DDD model is a great candidate
for determining the effectiveness of the policies. This type of model is used when a
natural experiment can be developed. It was a great model for the data that was used for
this study to determine if the subsidies had the intended consequences on the target
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population, the self-employed. The dependent variable represents whether the individual
purchased health insurance privately or not. The variable of interest for the DDD is the
variable that interacts whether an individual is self-employed, whether an individual is
from a state with a subsidy program or not and whether we are looking at before or after
the policy implementation.
Model (1) below was used to determine whether or not the policy was effective in
increasing the probability that a self-employed individual will purchase health insurance.
The variable of interest is self-employed, subsidized and after policy year, our DDD
variable, which interacts self_employed, subsidy, and after multiplicatively.

contains the covariates age, male, married, ethnicity variables (white, black,
Native, Asian, and Hispanic), lninc (natural log of income), occupation type variables1
and kids. These covariates were included because of their impact on the choice to
purchase private insurance.

includes dummies (and all of the interaction terms) for

self-employed, whether the individual was in a state that offered a subsidy or not and if
we are looking at before or after the policy implementation. The coefficient
most interest. If

is of the

is positive and statistically significant then self-employed individuals

in states that have subsidized the purchase of health insurance after the start of the policy
are more likely to be covered by private health insurance. The literature, as presented
earlier, is undecided as to whether subsidies are effective, therefore, it is assumed that
there will be no effect of the subsidy on the likelihood to become self-employed.
1

The occupation categories are as follows: 1) Management, business and financial occupations 2)
Professional and related occupations 3) Service occupations 4) Sales and related occupations 5) Office and
administrative support occupations 6) Farming, fishing and forestry occupations 7) Construction and
extraction occupations 8) Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations 9) Production occupations 10)
Transportation and material moving occupations 11) Armed Forces
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Model (2), which was used to test whether the policy increased the probability
that an individual would choose to become self-employed, was motivated by the
following theoretical model. Age has been deemed important in the decision to become
an entrepreneur by the job-

shopping models employed by Miller (1984) despite the fact that Evans and Leighton
(1989) find that the decision to become an entrepreneur is independent of age and that
men are more likely to be entrepreneurs. Some occupations have more opportunities for
entrepreneurship and some industries will have fewer barriers to entry. Meyer (1990)
reports that the percentage of black business owners is about one-third that of whites.
Therefore, the theoretical model includes a control for ethnicity. Liquidity constraints
have been found to be important in the choice to become self-employed, where those
with insufficient funds are less likely to become self-employed (Evans and Jovanovic
1989; Branchflower and Oswald 1998) and therefore the theoretical model includes a
control for income. Ideally, I would control for personal savings but I did not have this
variable in the data and was not able to include this in the empirical analysis.
Theoretically, I would control for the cost of health insurance but that data were not
available either. The social environment of an individual including exposure to other
family members being self-employed or a close friend deciding to become self-employed
have a statistically significant effect on the choice to become self-employed (Djankov, et
al. 2008). We were able to control for the demographic information but did not have the

23

necessary data to see if controlling for the social environment would have changed the
results.
The main variable of interest in Model (2) is the DID variable, subsidy_after,
which interacts subsidy and after multiplicatively.

Once again,

contains the covariates age, male, married, ethnicity variables

(white, black, native, Asian, and Hispanic), lninc, occupation type variables and kids.
includes dummies (and all of the interaction terms) for whether the individual was in a
state that offered a subsidy or not and if we are looking at before or after the policy
implementation. The coefficient

is still of the most interest. If

positive and

statistically significant then the health insurance subsidies increased the probability that
an individual will choose to become self-employed.
Results
The results from the logit models (1) and (2) are shown in Table 3. Of the
covariates, age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, income, number of children and years of
education were all statistically significant. The older the individuals were the more likely
to be insured; males were less likely to be insured; married individuals were more likely
to be insured; those with higher income and more years of education were more likely to
be insured; and the more children you have the less likely you are to be insured. At first
glance, it seemed strange that the probability of being insured would decrease with the
number of children. But household expenses increase with the number children and
therefore, there may be less disposable income to purchase health insurance. Also, the
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price of health insurance increases with the size of a family and individuals may no
longer be able to afford the health insurance premiums.
Table 3. Logit Regression Results (Marginal Effects)
VARIABLES
age
male
married
white
native
hispanic
lninc
educ
kids
sub_self_after
sub_after
Observations

(1)
priv_ins
0.0016***
(0.0001)
-0.0067*
(0.0038)
0.1580***
(0.0044)
0.0735***
(0.0224)
-0.2630***
(0.0194)
-0.0543**
(0.0085)
0.0131***
(0.0006)
0.0250***
(0.0007)
-0.0081***
(0.0017)
0.0401**
(0.0192)
-0.0084
(0.0074)
70320

(2)
self-employed
0.0034***
(0.0001)
0.0384***
(0.0028)
0.0199***
(0.0030)
0.0199***
(0.0111)
Not significant
Not significant
-0.0169***
(0.0006)
0.0044***
(0.0005)
0.0139***
(0.0012)

0.0003
(0.0051)
58217

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Gruber and Poterba (1994), Hein and Lurie (2009) and Selden (2009) all
find that the self-employed health insurance take-up rate increases with a decrease in the
price of health insurance, even though their estimated price elasticity differed. Gumus
and Regan (2009) find that the self-employed are not responsive to changes in the price
of health insurance. In this analysis, price data is not included and actual take-up rates are
not calculated. The first question of interest is have the state health insurance subsidies
increased the likelihood that a self-employed individual will purchase health insurance?
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The coefficient of the DDD variable, sub_self_after, which interacts self_employed,
subsidy and after, had a value of 0.0401 and was significant at the 5% level.
Therefore, the probability that a self-employed individual in a state that had implemented
a subsidy would be covered by private insurance increased by about 4 percentage points
after the subsidies were implemented when compared to the self-employed in the control
states. This finding is consistent with some of the findings in the literature but the debate
of the effectiveness of subsidies will continue. We ran model (1) and redefined our
dependent variable as having private insurance in your own name. Our results were
different. We found no statistically significant impact of the subsidy on take up rates in
this case. This lends support to the possibility that the take up rates increased because
more people became insured by their spouse’s insurance plans but we have no reason to
believe this was the case.
Now for the second question, have state health insurance subsidies increased the
likelihood that a person will become self-employed? The results suggest that the subsidies
were not enough to increase the probability that an individual in the treatment states after
the policies would decide to become self-employed. This is not surprising and the
findings supported those of Moore (2003). The determinants of the choice to become
self-employed involve much more than the cost of health insurance. By comparing the
theoretical model to the empirical model, we can see that there are many other factors
including the cost of insurance, personal savings and the social environment for which I
was not able to control.
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Conclusion
Many of the studies addressing the effectiveness of health insurance subsidies on
the take-up rate of the self-employed have focused on either federal policies, such as
TRA86 and OECSA, or the federal policies in combination with state policies. This
natural experiment isolates the effects of the state policies from the federal policy effects
by looking at a group of states that subsidize the cost of health insurance as a treatment
group and a group of similar states that have not implemented such policies as a control
group. We were able to do so because there were no changes to the federal policy after
2003 and it applied to all states. We find that a self-employed individual in the treatment
states after the state subsidized the cost of health insurance was more likely to be covered
by private insurance. This finding adds to the debate as to whether health insurance
subsidies are an effective approach to lower the amount of uninsured in the U.S. With the
implementation of a public health care option, this body of research will continue to be
important.
However, we do not find that the subsidies increased the probability that an
individual would choose to become self-employed, which is not surprising due to the
number of other factors involved in this decision. Subsidizing entry (e.g. health insurance
costs) or start-up costs may cause an increase in the number of inefficient firms to enter
the market. This could cause an increase in the failure rate of new businesses. However, it
is hard to determine a “healthy” rate of business failure (Holtz-Eakin 2000).
One weakness of this study is that the CPS data is not collected to represent the
smaller U.S. states sufficiently and therefore may be underrepresented in our data. Also,
this paper does not discuss any of the policy changes brought on by the recent healthcare
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reform. The reform increases some of the subsidies by increasing the type of deductions
that can be made for health care costs for small businesses. Also, we did not have data on
health status. That would have been useful to include in the covariates to account for
adverse selection in this market. Further, the natural experiment could be compromised if
the control states and the treatment states reacted differently to the recent recession. The
after policy year is 2009, which is at the height of the recent recession.
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CHAPTER 2
ENTREPRENEURIAL SUBJECTS AND FINANCIAL RISK DECISIONS: AN
EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF AN AMERICAN AND BRAZILIAN
SAMPLE

Abstract
There are risks involved when starting a business, but as entrepreneurs take this risk they
are creating jobs and supporting local economic development. This paper employs an
economic experiment to determine if there is a difference between the risk aversion levels
of entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial subjects when making a risky financial
decision. The experiment was conducted in the United States and replicated in Brazil,
therefore, we were able to conduct a cross country comparison. In the U.S., 78 students
participated and 54 in Brazil. Using the Entrepreneurial Attitude Orientation, subjects
were categorized as either entrepreneurial or not. Entrepreneurial subjects invested into a
risky asset at a higher rate than the non-entrepreneurial subjects, although not all tests
showed statistical significance. Also, the entrepreneurial subjects from Brazil invested
into the risky asset at a higher rate than the U.S. entrepreneurial subjects. First round
investment results affected the investment decisions in the second round suggesting the
existence of the hot hand and gambler’s fallacy phenomena.
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Introduction
Frank Knight and Joseph Schumpeter differed greatly in their theories of the risk
taking attitudes of entrepreneurs. Knight (1921) asserted that entrepreneurs took financial
risks when starting their own enterprise and therefore could be deterred by liquidity
constraints. Knight believed that it was part of the basic function of an entrepreneur to
bear more financial risk than other actors in an economy. However, Schumpeter (1934)
asserted that the entrepreneur and the capitalist were two different actors in the economy
and therefore the financial risk was taken on by the capitalist, not the entrepreneur. For
Schumpeter, the capitalist is the person responsible for financing entrepreneurial ventures
and he believed that this individual was not the entrepreneur himself. Therefore, the
capitalist was taking on the majority of the financial risk. The design of the experiment in
this chapter does not distinguish between an entrepreneur and a capitalist.
The literature is rich with a theoretical view of the risk aversion levels of
entrepreneurs. This paper expands an empirical literature that includes very few
experiments. The paper examines if entrepreneurial subjects differ in their financial risk
behavior when compared to non-entrepreneurial subjects. This is one of the first
economic experiments that tests the differences in risk behaviors between more and less
entrepreneurial subjects. One hypothesis that is tested is whether entrepreneurial subjects
are less financially risk averse than non-entrepreneurial subjects, following the Knightian
view.
For policymakers, it is important to know if a potential entrepreneur is more risk
averse when making financial decisions. If liquidity constraints are a barrier to entry for
entrepreneurs then public policy can be designed to help cushion some of the risk, for
example, subsidizing start-up costs. Manufacturing and hi-tech entrepreneurial ventures
30

normally require a large amount of start-up capital. If potential entrepreneurs are no less
risk averse than their counterparts then subsidizing this capital does not incentivize more
entrepreneurial activity. However, even if there is no difference in risk perception
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, a subsidy would still overcome liquidity
constraints. Therefore, it would be difficult to determine which barrier was eased due to
the subsidy.
The experimental subjects are categorized as entrepreneurial or not based on the
results of the subjects’ responses to the Entrepreneurial Attitude Orientation (EAO). This
is an attitudinal survey. Over the recent years, there has a been a trend in social science
experiments to look at personality and behavior scales to try to explain differences in the
way subjects perform in experiments (Ben-Ner and Kramer 2011; Boon, Bradander and
Witteloostujin 1999; Deck, Lee and Reyes 2010; Ho, Weingart and Rousseau 2004;
Swope et al. 2008).
The subjects were students from either the University of New Mexico in
Albuquerque, New Mexico or the Universidade Católica de Brasília in Brasília, DF
Brazil. The subjects completed a version of the EAO and were then asked to invest all or
part of their participation fee in a risky asset. The participation fees were 10 US dollars
(US$) for the sessions held in the U.S. and 10 Brazilian Reais (R$10) for the sessions
held in Brazil. At the time of the experiment the exchange rate was about US$1 to
R$1.75. If Knight’s beliefs hold true then entrepreneurial subjects should invest more
than the non-entrepreneurial subjects. If differences do exist between their behaviors then
Schumpeter would say that this difference is attributed to something other than their
entrepreneurial tendencies. Schumpeter’s view is that other structural differences between
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the two groups must exist to explain the differences in their behaviors such as gender,
age, ethnicity or other demographic variables.
The results show that the subjects that were categorized as entrepreneurial did not
invest at higher rates than their counterparts but these results are highly sensitive to
varying measures of entrepreneurial attitude. Entrepreneurial subjects from Brazil
invested at a higher rate than the entrepreneurial subjects in the U.S. but the nonentrepreneurial subjects from the U.S. invested more than their Brazilian equivalents. The
Brazilian responses showed signs of hot hand behavior and the U.S. data showed signs of
the gambler’s fallacy. The hot hand phenomenon suggests that if you have previously
won you perceive a higher chance of winning than the actual probability of winning. The
gambler’s fallacy exists when someone believes that the probability of winning is now
higher because he/she has recently sustained repeated losses. Both types of events are due
to individuals’ failure to recognize the independent nature of risky events.
This chapter continues with a literature review including the following topics: risk
and entrepreneurship; house money effect; the hot hand and the gambler’s fallacy; and
demographic and cultural differences in risk behavior.
Risk and entrepreneurship
Many entrepreneurship researchers at least mention the concept of risk and it is
often assumed that part of an entrepreneur’s function is to take on risk (Say 1803; Knight
1921; Mill 1984). The classical view implies that the decision to self-select into
entrepreneurial positions is affected by attitudes towards risk. Kihlstrom and Laffont
(1979) construct an entrepreneurial model using the theory of competitive equilibrium
under uncertainty. Their model suggests that an entrepreneur has relatively low levels of
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risk aversion. Research findings are not unanimous as to whether entrepreneurs are less
(or more) risk averse than non-entrepreneurs.
Using three different measures of risk aversion (reservation pricing
transformation, Arrow-Pratt, and lottery participation), Cramer et al. (2002) suggest that
the relationship between risk-aversion and entrepreneurship is negative, indicating that
those who self-select into entrepreneurship have lower levels of risk aversion. The
propensity to be an entrepreneur was defined as whether, at any time, the individual
became self-employed. The fifty year dataset used included responses from the Brabant
survey administered in the Netherlands in 1952. The subjects included 5800
schoolchildren at least at the age of 12. All traceable subjects were re-interviewed in
1983 and 1993. The earlier questionnaire provided aptitude scores and parental
background data. The later surveying provided data on entrepreneurship, risk attitude and
wealth.
A main concern for many researchers is the tool used to extract the risk attitudes
of entrepreneurs. The validity of the instrument used to extract risk attitudes is often
questioned. Even so, using an experimentally validated survey instrument, Caliendo,
Fossen and Kritikos (2009) conclude that people with higher inclination towards risk
have a significantly higher probability to become an entrepreneur. In this line of research,
the risk attitude of an individual is assumed to be one of the main determinants in
becoming an entrepreneur.
On the other hand, Rosen and Willen (2002) suggest that willingness to accept
risk is not the dominating factor in the decision to become an entrepreneur or selfemployed. They argue that the assumption that risk aversion drives the choice between
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self-employment and wage-earning conflicts with empirical data. Others have examined
the Knightian view of entrepreneurship, which says that entrepreneurship is a form of risk
sharing and profits a return to risk bearing. One such study finds that these Knightian
predictions are implausible (Newman 2007). The argument for whether risk is the
determining factor in an individual choosing to become an entrepreneur remains
extremely difficult to verify. With that being said, there is obviously a relationship
between entrepreneurship and risk but determining the causality is an empirical
challenge. Besides risk aversion levels, the choice to become an entrepreneur is affected
by many other hard to measure factors, for example, previous exposure to
entrepreneurship and social/environmental conditions.
House money effect
Imagine that you decide to participate in a lottery and on the way to buy a ticket
you find a twenty dollar bill. Would you buy more lottery tickets because you found the
money? If the house money (or sometimes called the found money) effect exists then
people would be more willing to gamble after a gain. These effects have been explained
behaviorally. Thaler (1985) asserts that “mental accounting” takes place and people place
windfall gains in a different “mental account” than other money. The various “mental
accounts” differ in their marginal propensities to consume. Under the quasi-hedonic
editing hypothesis, Thaler and Johnson (1990) suggest that in the case of a gain, losses
that are smaller than the original gain can be grouped together with prior gains reducing
loss aversion and increasing risk seeking. In essence, a loss stings less when it comes out
of winnings and not from someone’s “own” money. When winnings are depleted, the
losses hurt more. Thaler and Johnson (1990) set up a one stage and two stage gambling
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experiment. The two stage version takes into account prior gains and has an expected
value of zero. They used eight different problems, each including a one and two stage
gamble. See Table 4 for an example.
Table 4. One- and Two-Stage Lotteries of Thaler and Johnson (1990)
Two-Stage Gambles
Choices
Problem
1

Initial
Outcome
+$15

Payoff
$0
$4.50
-$4.50

Prob.
1
0.5
0.5

Percent Risk Seeking
two-stage
one-stage
N = 95
N = 111
77
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One-Stage Gambles
Choices
Payoff
$15
$19.50
$10.50

In problem 1, the respondents who won more than they lost gamble differently,
assumedly because they have not depleted their winnings and are still playing with house
money. In problem 1, 77% of the subjects were risk-seeking in the two-stage version
opposed to 44% being risk-seeking in the one-stage.
These results are counter to predictions such as the “no memory” prospect theory
and the concreteness hypothesis (Slovic 1972). In “no memory” prospect theory, prior
outcomes do not alter decisions in the future. The prior outcomes are “encoded, valued
and then forgotten” (Thaler and Johnson 1990). Slovic (1972) presents what he calls a
general principle in decision making known as concreteness. The concreteness theory
supposes that information explicitly displayed in a given object or stimulus will be used
only in the form that it is presented. Also, it asserts that information stored in memory,
inferred or transformed tends to be discounted or totally ignored. If the house money
effect exists then previous events will alter the way a subject gambles.
Weber and Zuchel (2005) conduct a two round sequential decision making
experiment but frame the experiment in two different formats: Portfolio vs. Lottery. In
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Prob.
1
0.5
0.5

both of the presentation formats the subjects received an endowment. In the portfolio
format, the subjects decided how many units to buy (from 1 to 10) in the first round at
varying prices. In the second round, subjects could purchase units, sell units or do
nothing at all. This format resembles common financial investment decisions. In the
lottery format, the same opportunities for risk were presented with the same attainable
payoff distributions as in the portfolio format. However, the decisions were made as a
sequence of two opportunities to participate in a betting game. See Table 5 for more
details about the two presentation formats.
Table 5. Portfolio and Lottery Formats
Portfolio Format

Lottery Format

Endowment

Subjects receive 6 Deutsche Marks
(DM) at the beginning of Period 1

Subjects receive 6 DM in two
installments (3 in each period)

Opportunity Set

0 to 10 units in all decisions

0 to 10 units in all decisions

Payoff Profile

A unit generates either a gain of
0.40 DM (price increase) or a loss
of 0.30 DM (price decrease in each
period. Gains and losses are
equally likely

A unit generates either a gain of
0.40 DM (payoff 0.70 DM
minus cost of 0.30 DM) or a loss
of 0.30 DM (cost of purchase).
Gains and losses are equally
likely.

*Source Weber and Zuchel (2005)
Subjects had to make two contingent decisions in the second round: One
for a gain in the first round and one for a loss. They analyzed the number of units held
and more units represented higher risk taking. If prior outcomes affected risk behavior
then the number of units held would differ depending on whether the first round was a
win or loss. This setup allowed Weber and Zuchel to see if subjects behaved differently
in the second round in the case of a gain or loss in the first round. They find conflicting
evidence based on the presentation method. In the portfolio decision format risk taking is
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greater following losses rather than gains. However, when using a two-stage betting game
presentation, they find that risk taking is greater following gains rather than losses.
Clark (2002) asks whether the house money effect drives the observed high levels of
voluntary contribution to a public good. Using two treatments of the voluntary
contribution mechanism (VCM) design, Clark conducted his experiment with 150 student
subjects. 75 had house money and 75 had own money. The design of the experiment
followed the VCM designs of Isaac et al. (1984) and Andreoni (1995). In both treatments,
each student was told to bring $8 with them to the experiment and knew that he or she
could avoid losing this money with certainty through his or her decisions. At the
beginning of the own money sessions subjects were asked for their $8 and the house
money group was not. Clark found that the mean contribution was higher in the house
money session than in the own money session but this difference was not statistically
significant at any relevant level. Therefore, he concludes that the found money effect did
not explain the high public good contributions observed in experiments. However,
Harrison (2007) reexamines Clark’s data with different statistical approaches and found
evidence of the house money effect.
Ackert, et al. (2006) searched for the existence of a house money effect in a
dynamic setting by conducting a multi-period financial experiment. The experiment
consisted of nine sessions; in five, subjects were endowed with $60 (low endowment) and
in four they were endowed with $75 (high endowment). There were three periods in each
session consisting of eight traders. The low endowment sessions had six markets and the
high endowment sessions had eight markets. In these markets, subjects had the
opportunity to buy stock and receive dividends. They find an average initial price of the
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stock was $17.10 in the low endowment sessions and $20.37 for the high endowment
sessions. The price difference was significant at the 5% level. Therefore, they find
evidence of the house money effects in the dynamic, financial setting. Even after
truncating the data to alleviate the effects of extreme bids, the results remained
significant.
Davis et al. (2010) posit that cash participation fees are commonly used in
experiments to incentivize voluntary participation but there is little to no mention of when
this fee should be paid. The subjects of their experiment were given the option of buying
a good at a posted price. The value of the good was determined by drawing a ball from a
bingo cage. In the later rounds of the sessions, subjects were given the opportunity to
purchase information about the value of the good. The 2 x 2 factorial design experiment
included treatments for participation payment and quality of information. In one half of
the sessions subjects were paid a lump sum payment at the end of the experiment and the
other half were their participation payment in cash upon arrival at the experiment. The
second treatment included differentiating between certain and uncertain information. If a
subject purchased uncertain information then they received the actual value of the good
80% of the time and a value less than the actual value 20% of the time. They find that
paying the participation fee upon arrival, instead of at the end of the experiment, was
associated with more frequent information purchase but not necessarily indicative of
purchasing the certain information. They suggest these findings support the house money
effect.
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Hot hand and gambler’s fallacy
Two phenomena often found when examining risk behavior are the “hot hand”
and the “gambler’s fallacy”. The hot hand phenomenon suggests that you have a higher
perceived chance of winning than the actual probability of winning only because you
have won previously. For example, if you have ten lottery balls, numbered one through
ten, and you correctly guess the number three times in a row you may believe that you
have a hot hand and that your chance of guessing the correct number on the fourth
occasion is higher than the actual chance, one out of ten.
An example of gambler’s fallacy is if a person believes that since they lost four
consecutive times they are due for a win. The gambler believes that he or she is more
likely to win after a series of losses than he or she actually is. It can also be described as
the belief that an independent event is unlikely to happen if it has happened repeatedly.
The probability of the event happening again is assessed as being lower than it actually is.
Both of these irrational beliefs are akin to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1971) law of small
numbers, which says that a gambler overestimates power, overestimates significance,
underestimates confidence intervals and has little opportunity to recognize sampling
variation.
The “hot hand” concept originated in the game of basketball. Often times, people
believe that if you make a large number of shots in a row then you are more likely to
make the next. Even though “hot hand” research is much easier when looking at a coin
flip, some researchers have used actual basketball data to test for this phenomenon.
Gilovich et al. (1985) present three different studies looking at the hot hand in basketball.
One study involved basketball fans who were given questionnaires that examined their
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beliefs regarding sequential dependence among shots. The results were overwhelming:
91% of the 50 fans believed that a player has “a better chance of making a shot after
having just made his last two or three shots than he does after having just missed his last
two or three shots”. In the second study, they analyzed field goal records from 48 home
games of the Philadelphia 76ers and their opponents during the 1980-81 season. The
results suggest that the outcome of one shot was largely independent of the outcome of
the previous shot. The final study involved a controlled shooting experiment using
members of Cornell’s intercollegiate basketball teams. The final study investigated the
ability of players to predict their own performance. In the final study, the results were the
same as the previous two. The players’ predictions revealed a belief in the hot hand but
no correlation between shots was found.
Offerman and Sonnemans (2004) conduct an experiment to test if the hot hand
effect explains overreaction better than recency or vice versa. In sports, overreaction is
associated with an unfounded belief in a “hot hand.” In financial markets, stocks that
performed badly over a period of time are often undervalued and stocks that were doing
well are overvalued (De Bondt and Thaler 1984). De Bondt and Thaler assume that the
overreaction they measured was due to recency, which assumes that people overweight
recent information. Their experiment was completely computerized and involved a coin
being drawn from an urn that contained 100 coins. 50 of these coins were fair coins,
where heads and tails always have a 50% chance of being tossed, but 50 of the coins were
unfair coins, where heads and tails both have a 50% chance of being tossed on the first
toss. However, after this initial toss the probability of repeating the outcome of the
previous toss is 70%. They received different point values for correctly predicting the
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outcome of tossing a fair and unfair coin. To compare the hot hand and the recency
explanations, they focused on the fair coin results. They hypothesized that subjects would
overestimate the probability of an unfair coin when the coin seems unfair. A Wilcoxon
rank test revealed that the hot-hand hypothesis beat all other explanations of the
overreaction phenomenon in their study, including recency.
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory suggests “that a person who has
not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be unacceptable to
him otherwise.” The gambler’s fallacy refers to the tendency for gamblers to believe that,
since they have recently sustained repeated losses, the probability of winning is now
higher. Clotfelter and Cook (1993) examine data from the Maryland daily numbers game
to see if lottery players exhibit gambler’s fallacy type behavior. The Maryland Lottery
computes a total prize liability for a given number. This liability is a convenient indicator
of the intensity of betting on a given number. Looking at the winning numbers drawn
during March and April of 1988 and also the frequency of numbers that were recorded
during that period, the authors computed the liability of the numbers on which people bet.
They then indexed this liability by the total bets placed in a day. The results show that
after certain numbers win the amount of people choosing those numbers in the
subsequent days falls dramatically, until gradually, the frequency of which the number is
chosen rises. They offer two explanations for this finding. One is that when a number hits
the people who normally choose that number stop betting. An alternative explanation is
that people believe when a number is drawn, the probability of it being drawn over the
next few weeks or months is reduced. This would support the existence of the gambler’s
fallacy in lottery players’ behavior.
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Similar to Clotfelter and Cook (1993), Terrell (1994) examines state lottery data
to determine whether the gambler’s fallacy exists. Looking at five years of data from the
New Jersey lottery’s “Pick 3”, Terrell constructs a regression model to test the
hypothesis. In this analysis, Terrell includes a cost for choosing a gambler’s fallacy
strategy, unlike the Maryland study. Even with a more complex analysis, Terrell suggests
that the gambler’s fallacy does in fact influence the behavior of those who play New
Jersey’s “Pick 3” lottery game.
The previous studies suggest that the gambler’s fallacy may affect the behavior of
lottery players but what about casino gamblers? Croson and Sundali (2005) were able to
test roulette data from a large casino in Reno, Nevada. The researchers were supplied
with video footage from which they compiled their data set. They observed nine hundred
and four spins of the roulette wheel by 139 players placing 24,131 bets. They used
different lengths of time for the streak period. For example, if the streak period equaled
four and black was played on all four turns then a red play on the next turn was counted
as a gambler’s fallacy bet. For streak lengths of two through four, they found that at least
half of the bets were gambler fallacy bets but this difference was not significant.
However, at lengths of five and six, there was statistically significant evidence of the
gambler’s fallacy. At lengths of six or more, 85% of the bets showed support for the
gambler’s fallacy.
Casinos and lottery play are two very good arenas in which to look for behavior
supporting the gambler’s fallacy but it is often difficult to gain access to data. Therefore,
many researchers conduct laboratory experiments to generate their own data. Huber et al.

42

(2010) use an economic experiment to investigate the gambler’s fallacy. Using a fortyround treatment of random coin tosses they find support for the gambler’s fallacy.
Demographic and cultural differences in risk behavior
Differences in levels of risk aversion or risk preference can sometimes be
attributed to differences in gender, age, marital status, ethnicity and cultural background.
Powell and Ansic’s (1997) experiments suggest that risk preferences differ by gender.
Iqbal et al. (2006) examine a data set from the 2000 edition of Standard and Poors
ExecuComp database that consisted of 69,767 person-year observations, (of which 67,004
were from males and 2,763 were from females) spanning from 1992 until 2000. They
analyzed changes in executives’ shares when new stock options were available and
interpreted a decrease in shares as a reduction of risk. Using multiple regression analyses,
the authors concluded that female executives were no more risk averse than males. These
findings support other studies that suggest that there is no difference between male and
female levels of risk aversion (Cecil 1972; Masters and Meier 1988; Schubert et al.
1999).
However, many studies suggest that the opposite is true. For example, Barber and
Odean (2001) tested the hypothesis that men are more overconfident when making
financial decisions than women. Employing over 35,000 household level trading records,
they examine financial transactions, returns from these transactions, transaction turnover
and security selection. They find that men are more overconfident and, in turn, women
were more risk averse. Their findings were specifically pronounced among single men
and women. The literature is rich with studies focused on differences in risk levels and
preferences among men and women. A large number of studies support Barber and
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Odean’s result, finding that men are less risk averse, especially when it comes to financial
decisions (Eckel and Grossman 2008; Hudgens and Fatkin 1984; Jianakoplos and
Bernasek 1998; Olsen and Cox 2001).
Several studies find that there is a significant relationship between age and risk
attitudes (Al-Ajmi 2008; Hallahan, Faff and McKenzie 2004; Harbaugh, Krause and
Vesterlund 2002; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). Many researchers find that risk
tolerance decreases with age. Yao et al. (2011) examines data from the 1989-2007
versions of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to analyze age, generation and
period effects on risk tolerance. They employed an ordered logit model and developed
three risk tolerance categories: substantial risk, high risk and some risk. These were all
constructed from one question on the survey asking about how much financial risk the
respondent and their spouse/partner are willing to take when saving money or making
investments. The results show that willingness to take risk decreased with age. This could
be due to less time being available to recoup losses.
Even as the literature suggests a negative relationship between risk tolerance and
age, Riley and Chow (1992) suggest that a rise in risk tolerance levels happens after the
age of 65. Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) estimated the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of risk
aversion using data from the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study. Using
multivariate semi-log regression analysis, they find that a one-year increase in age
decreases risk aversion by around 5%. They too found that, after 65, risk tolerance may
no longer decrease and may begin to increase.
There may be no difference in the risk behavior or attitude of married versus
unmarried individuals (Haliassos and Bertaut 1995; McInish 1982), however, some
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researchers have found that married individuals are more risk averse than unmarried
individuals. When someone is married they may take into account the risk preferences of
their spouse or partner when making decisions. Also, an unmarried individual may have
much less to lose than someone who is married, which would lead to the married person
being more risk averse. Halek and Eisenhauer (2001) suggest that married heads of
households have significantly lower levels of risk-taking when compared to the
unmarried.
A large portion of the risk studies look at the relationship between demographic
indicators and financial risk attitudes. However, a wealth of literature compares health
risk attitudes and age/gender. Health risks include seat belt usage, drinking and driving,
smoking habits, drinking habits, etc. For example, West et al. (1996) administered the
Health Risk Behavior Survey to students at eight state universities in Florida and
obtained 1,150 observations. They cluster the questions relating to different types of
personal safety e.g. driving safety, fighting, carrying weapons, suicide, etc. and
conducted contingency (or frequency) analysis. They find that: more married individuals
wore a seat belt (when riding or driving); fewer married individuals recently rode with a
driver who had been drinking; and fewer married drove while drinking. These figures
were all compared to the unmarried.
There is also research that suggests that married individuals are less risk averse.
Grable (2000) first defines risk tolerance as “the maximum amount of uncertainty that
someone is willing to accept when making a financial decision.” He goes on to conduct
an analysis of randomly sampled data obtained from 1,075 faculty and staff at a large
southeastern university in 1997. He used descriptive discriminant analysis, more
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specifically, univariate test statistics and found that married individuals were more risk
tolerant. These findings conflicted with most of the research conducted in this area and
this analysis may have been too simple to control for other relevant factors.
Race and ethnicity have a significant relationship with levels of risk aversion but
the direction of this relationship remains an open question. Halek and Eisenhaur (2001)
find that Hispanics and Blacks are consistently less risk averse than Whites and other
races. Conversely, Sung and Hanna (1996) use the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finance to
investigate risk tolerance among different demographic groups. Using expected utility as
their theoretical model, they find Hispanics to be less risk tolerant than whites. Other
studies also suggest that race/ethnicity plays an important role in risk attitude
(Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Leigh 1986).
Finally, cross-cultural differences in risk perception have been observed.
However, these studies are rare due to their high administrative cost. Locating funding,
having contacts in other countries, recruiting foreign subjects, and getting approval to
conduct these international studies deter researchers from pursuing these types of studies.
Two studies that have considered cross-cultural differences in risk attitudes are
Bontempo et al. (1997) and Weber and Hsee (1988). Bontempo et al. includes students
from large universities in Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Netherlands and the U.S. as subjects.
Their subject pool also includes a group of Taiwanese security analysts. They presented
the subjects with thirty different monetary lotteries. These were constructed by taking a
basic lottery and transforming which changed the expected value, variance and skewness.
The subjects were shown each option three times in random order. The subjects were
asked to rate the riskiness of each gamble on a scale of 0-100. They used a repeated-
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measures analysis of variance of the risk ratings offered by the subjects and included
nationality as an explanatory variable. They did not find a systematic difference in the
way subjects from different nationalities rated the gambles. However, they did find that
different elements of the gambles were weighted differently, meaning, subjects from
different nationalities came to the same risk rating but did so in systematically different
manners.
Weber and Hsee (1998) also used students as subjects and gathered a sample from
the U.S., China, Poland and Germany. Subjects responded to questions about their
perception and reaction to financial investment options that yielded three possible
outcomes. At least one outcome was a gain and at least one was a loss. They had
graphical and numerical illustrations of the probabilities of obtaining each of the three
outcomes. Each question was asked twice but in different orders and they were told to
assume that they were investing with their own money. By looking at WTP as mean
judgment and through regression analysis, the authors conclude that cultural differences
exist in the pricing of the risky options and that these differences were attributed to the
way the subjects from different cultures perceived the risk. In addition to differences in
risk behaviors, the theoretical motivation for this experiment hinges on the perceived (or
actual) existence of wage differentials.
Wage differentials
Many studies find a wage gap between races, genders and different age groups.
Using a reduced form model, Hotchkiss and Shiferaw (2011) use supply and demand
factors to explain wage gaps among workers. As they expected, older, more experienced
and more educated individuals earn higher wages. In our data, we have age, gender, and
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ethnicity data and we assume that older, white males would have higher wage
expectations.
Researchers also observe a wage gap between equally productive men and
women. The wage gap has not only been observed empirically in the United States
(Weinberger 1998) but also in Brazil (Lovell 2000), Italy (Favaro and Magrini 2008) and
Israel (Miki and Yuval 2011). The wage gap between genders could be due to
discrimination or differences in productivity. Others suggest that this gap exists because
women do not pursue college degrees in remunerative technical fields (Paglin and Rufulo
1990) and that women choose degrees that are more associated with anticipated family
responsibilities (Blakemore and Low 1984). For a meta-analysis of the gender wage gap,
please see Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005).
Ethnicity and race wage differentials have also been found. Studies show that
black workers receive lower wages than white workers and that the actual process for
determining their wages is different (Baffoe-Bonnie 2011). While investigating Brazil,
Lovell (2000) suggests wage discrimination in the labor market. Lovell finds that AfroBrazilians of the same education level receive lower wages than whites. Some of the
most important factors of the wage gap between races and ethnicities are the employment
category (Idson and Price 1992), education quality (Weinberger 1998), education level
(Hotchkiss and Shiferaw 2011) and experience/tenure (Favaro and Magrini 2008). If
individuals believe that they are going to receive lower wages in the labor market then
becoming an entrepreneur may be a method of overcoming these wage gaps.
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Experimental design
Subjects were recruited from the University of New Mexico (UNM) and the
Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB). At UNM, subjects were recruited from
undergraduate economics courses. At UCB, students were recruited from various
undergraduate courses. Exhibit 1 in the Appendix provides the script used during
recruitment. There has been discussion in the experimental literature as to whether
students were representative of the general population. The studies were conducted using
subjects in experiments drawn from many academic areas, including Political Science
(Mintz, Redd and Vedlitz 2006), Marketing (Enis, Cox and Stafford 1972) and
Economics (Depositario, et al. 2009; Potters and van Winden 1996; Dyer, Kagel and
Levin 1996). Most of the economic studies used auctions to test for a difference in
behavior and most do not find significant difference between students and professionals
in the experiments. Exhibit 2 in the Appendix shows the experiment script that was used
for each session. This information was translated into Portuguese for the experiment in
Brazil. To try to avoid any miscommunication, a native Brazilian read through the
dialogue during the experiment in Brazil. The narrator is a Brazilian and American
citizen and is completely bilingual. This allowed for clear explanation of the point of the
experiment and assurance that the narrator followed the script. All questions were
addressed by solely repeating the relevant information on the script.
Four sessions were held at UNM during a one week span. Three sessions were
held at UCB over a two week span. As students entered the classrooms, they were given
the consent form and asked to have a seat at a desk on which a study packet had been
placed. Once the door for the classroom was closed, no students were allowed to enter
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and the consent form was then explained in detail. The students were then given the time
to read and sign the consent form with the opportunity to ask for clarification.
After all of the consent forms were collected, the students were told about the
experiment packet on his or her desk. The packet contained a 21-question survey
(described in greater detail in the next section), an envelope containing 10 one dollar bills
(or 10 one real coins) and an empty envelope. The 10 Brazilian reias or 10 US dollars
will be represented as $10 for the rest of this discussion to avoid confusion. The subjects
were informed that the $10 was their payment for participating in the experiment. It was
phrased this way to try to correct for the found money effect. The subjects were then
asked to complete the survey. It took about 15 minutes on average across all sessions to
complete the survey. They were informed that all questions needed to be completed. The
survey did not mention “entrepreneurship” but did make attitudinal statements about
business behavior in which the subjects were instructed to rank. There was no reason to
believe that giving the survey before having the subjects participate in the financial risk
game would alter their strategy during the game.
Once all of the surveys were collected, the students were informed that they now
had the opportunity to invest all or part (in increments of one) of their $10 participation
fee in a risky asset with a 60% percent chance of gaining from their investment and a
40% chance of losing. If they gained from the investment then they would gain an
amount equal to their initial investment and if they lost then they would only lose the
amount they chose to invest. The 60-40 chance was represented by each subject choosing
a card from a stack of 10 playing cards, with replacement. The stack was comprised of
the ace through 10 of spades. The subjects were shown the stack of cards and were told
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that if they drew an ace through six then their investment would be doubled but if they
drew a seven through ten then they would lose their investment. They were then informed
that the empty envelope was for them to place the amount that they choose to invest.
Once everyone made their decisions and placed the amount of their investment into the
envelope, each subject was approached individually with the stack of cards. For each
subject, their investment envelope was collected and they were asked to draw a card from
the deck. As the subjects drew their cards, a W was recorded for a gain, if they drew an
ace through six, and an L was recorded for a loss if they drew a seven through ten. This
exercise was repeated until all of the subjects’ investments were collected and they had
drawn a card. Participants were asked to keep the results private but often times it was
obvious what the results were because of the reaction of the participants to his/her draw.
All the data from the first round were then recorded. Subjects who drew a losing
card received an empty envelope. If the subject gained from their investment then the
amount of money in the envelope was matched. For example, if the envelope was from a
subject that gained and it contained three dollars then the envelope containing six dollars
was returned to them.
An experimental ID was assigned to each subject and was used to identify which
envelope belonged to which subject. The subjects were also given an empty envelope 2.
They were now informed that they had the chance to invest in the same risky asset again
with the same chance of gaining and losing their investment. The second round
investment was given as another method to control for the found money effect and to
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When we returned the second round investments to the subjects at UCB, we did not return an empty
envelope. They used the same envelope from the first round for their second round investment. During the
experiments at UNM, the second envelope was a small source of confusion and did not add anything to the
experiment.
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create an opportunity to look for the hot hand or gambler’s fallacy phenomena. They
were given time to place their second round investment into the empty envelope. The
same criteria applied to the second round investment and the same process was followed
as before with the cards and recording of the results. The results from the second round
were returned along with a receipt. Subjects were asked to verify the data on the receipt
and were asked to sign the receipt. The receipts were then collected and the session
ended. At this point, all subjects were free to leave.
Survey tool
The survey tool was a short version of the EAO which was developed and
tested in 1991, and is shown on Exhibit 3 in the Appendix. A subset of the original 79
question version was used. The authors of the paper (Robinson, et al. 1991) that first
introduced the EAO tested its discriminate validity. By having a group of entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs complete the survey, they were able to distinguish whether the two
groups scored differently on each of the four subscales (achievement, personal control,
innovation, self-esteem) of the tool. By using an F-test, they found significant (at the 1%
level) differences between the subscale scores of the two groups. For each subscale, the
mean of the scores for the group of entrepreneurs was higher than the non-entrepreneurs
(Robinson, et al. 1991). Table 6 shows the group means for the entrepreneur vs. nonentrepreneur groups and describes the subscale scores.
Cronbach’s alpha3 was used to assess the internal consistency of the EAO’s
subscales. The authors wanted to ensure that each of the four different scale scores

3

A commonly used tool in statistics, especially in psychometric analysis, that measures the internal
consistency and reliability of a score. It is a special case of the Kuder-Richardson coefficient of
equivalence. More about this alpha can be seen in the cited work (Cronbach 1951).
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represented a uni-dimensional construct. Along with showing that this tool was able to
discriminate between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, they also tested the predictive
ability of the tool. They conducted a discriminate analysis using Wilks’ lambda 4 to
predict whether individuals were entrepreneurs or not using each of the four subscales.
All but one of the subscales (achievement) contributed significantly to the discriminate
function used for prediction. Using, the function classification coefficients, they were
able to predict group membership with 77% accuracy.
Table 6. Subscale Description and Group Means
Subscale
Achievement
Self-Esteem
Personal Control

Innovation

Description
Refers to concrete results associated with the
start-up and growth of a business venture.
Relates to perceiving and acting upon business
activities in new and unique ways.
Concerns the individual's perception of control
and influence over his or her business.
Pertains to the self-confidence and perceived
competency of an individual in conjunction with
his or her business affairs.

Group Means
Non-Ent.
Entrep.
6.457

7.278

6.274

7.06

5.244

6.583

5.293

6.639

*Source (Robinson, et al. 1991).
Theoretical model
In this model, when an agent decides whether to be a wage-earner or an
entrepreneur he/she weighs the probabilities below.
(

)

4

Wilks’ lambda is a test statistic used in multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to test whether
there are differences between the means of identified groups of subjects on a combination of dependent
variables. It performs, in the multivariate setting, with a combination of dependent variables, the same role
as the F-test performs in one-way analysis of variance. Wilks' lambda is a direct measure of the proportion
of variance in the combination of dependent variables that is unaccounted for by the independent variable
(the grouping variable or factor). More can be found about this test statistic by looking at (Everitt and Dunn
1991).
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(1)

The left side of the inequality represents the expected wages as an entrepreneur and is
equal to maximized profit.
output.

is the price an entrepreneur will receive for his or her

is entrepreneurial ability.

and

are the optimal levels of labor and capital

chosen by the entrepreneur, respectively.

and

respectively.

is the price of capital. Entrepreneurial ability

is the price of labor and

are the returns to labor and capital

differs between entrepreneurs and is known but not chosen. As entrepreneurial ability
increases expected wages increase.
The right side represents the wage expectations as a wage-earner.

is a vector of

individual characteristics that affects wage expectations. We assume wage expectations
increase in

.

and

are the education and amount of relevant experience of agent i

respectively. Wage expectations as a wage earner are increasing in education and relevant
experience. Therefore, if an agent has low wage expectations but high entrepreneurial
ability then he/she would be more likely to be an entrepreneur. On the other hand, if an
agent has low entrepreneurial ability but high wage expectations then he/she would be
more likely to be a wage-earner.
Hypotheses, results and discussion
Based on previous literature and findings, the following hypotheses are tested
using only the data from the experiments.
H1:

There will be no difference in risk aversion between U.S. and Brazil

subjects.
H2:

Women will be more risk averse.

H3:

Older subjects will be more risk averse.

H4:

Married subjects will be more risk averse.
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H5:

There will be no difference in the entrepreneurial values between

countries.
H6:

More entrepreneurial subjects will be less risk averse.

H7:

Subjects that won in the first round will wager more in the second round
than those who lost.

Table 7 shows the summary statistics of the participant characteristics and the variable
descriptions with means and standard deviations. The “other” category for the ethnic
breakdown of participants at UNM included the following responses: Middle Eastern,
Hawaiian and no response. The “other” category had a blank beside the choice to fill in
ethnicity. One participant chose “other” but did not fill in the blank. Moreno was not
given as a choice for ethnicity at UNM. One of the Brazilian participants did not
complete the ethnicity question and the participant that chose “other” did not fill in the
blank. Hispanic and Native American were not given as choices for ethnicity at UCB.
The average total winnings of the pooled data were $12.14. In the U.S. the
average was US$12.85 and R$11.13 for Brazil. The minimum total winnings were zero in
both the U.S. and Brazil and the maximum was R$27 in Brazil and US$40 in U.S. All of
the data used was generated from the survey and the experiments and no outside data
were introduced.
The investment percentage variable was calculated by summing the amounts
invested in rounds 1 and 2 and dividing it by the sum of the first and second round
starting values. Round 1 starting value for everyone was R$/US$10. The starting value
for Round 2 was calculated by summing the results (gains or losses) from Round 1 and
the amount of the Round 1 starting value
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Table 7. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics by Country
Description
Experiment
Variables
investment
percentage
round1percent
winround1
round2percent

Total investment as a
percentage of lab money
Round 1 investment as a
percentage of lab money
Indicator variable for a
gain in the first round
Round 2 investment as a
percentage of lab money

Survey Variables
innovation

achievement

control

esteem
entrepreneurial

Subscale score
representing innovation in
business
Subscale score
representing achievement
in business
Subscale score
representing perceived
personal control of
business outcomes
Subscale score
representing perceived
self-esteem in business
Indicator variable for
entrepreneurial = 1

Demographic
Variables
Indicator variable for
married
married = 1
age
Age in years
Indicator variable for
male
male
Indicator variable for
Black
black
Indicator variable for
White
white
Indicator variable for
Hispanic*
Hispanic
Indicator variable for
Asian
Asian
Indicator variable for
Moreno**
Moreno
Indicator variable for
Native*
native
Indicator variable for
Other
other ethnicity
Indicator variable for
Brazil
Brazilian participant
*The values only include the US sample

Mean

Standard Deviation

Brazil

US

Pooled

Brazil

US

Pooled

45.660

47.870

46.966

19.729

22.759

21.520

50.185

49.743

49.924

23.592

24.599

24.102

0.574

0.654

0.621

0.499

0.479

0.487

37.523

42.939

40.724

19.729

26.597

24.741

Brazil

US

Pooled

Brazil

US

Pooled

6.190

6.662

6.469

1.372

1.300

1.345

7.944

7.521

7.694

1.351

1.048

1.195

5.985

7.038

6.608

1.635

1.499

1.635

4.419

4.603

4.527

0.995

0.710

0.840

0.333

0.526

0.447

0.476

0.503

0.499

Brazil

US

Pooled

Brazil

US

Pooled

0.167

0.064

0.106

0.376

0.247

0.309

25.944

21.641

23.402

8.588

5.122

7.055

0.481

0.590

0.545

0.504

0.495

0.500

0.092

0.013

0.045

0.113

0.293

0.209

0.463

0.474

0.470

0.503

0.503

0.501

N/A

0.256

0.256

N/A

0.439

0.439

0.019

0.115

0.076

0.136

0.322

0.266

0.389

N/A

0.389

0.492

N/A

0.492

N/A

0.077

0.077

N/A

0.268

0.268

0.019

0.064

0.045

0.136

0.247

0.209

0.409

**The values only include the Brazil sample
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0.494

that was not invested. The Round 2 starting value ranged from 0 to 20, the lowest and
highest possible values. The two investment percentages for each round, round1perc and
round2perc, were calculated by dividing the amount invested in each round by their
respective starting values. The subscale scores, innovation, achievement, control and
esteem were calculated by taking the average response to the associated survey questions.
Exhibit 3 in the Appendix gives more details about the determination of the value of each
subscale. To determine the cutoff for entrepreneurial, all of the subscales were averaged
and the comparative norm, 6.5, was used to set the cutoff value. The comparative norm
value came from Robinson, et al. (1991). If a subject scored higher than 6.5 then he or
she was deemed entrepreneurial and received a 1 for the entrepreneurial value. If a
subject scored less than or equal to 6.5 then he or she received a 0 for entrepreneurial.
All of the other variables can be understood by looking at Table 7. A sensitivity analysis
is shown later that provides how sensitive the results are to this cutoff value.
The investment percentages in the first round were higher than the investment
percentages in the second round. Subjects’ behavior in the second round depended on the
results from the first round investment and the results differed depending on country of
the sessions. Table 8 shows these differences. In the pooled data, if a subject lost in the
first round then the percent invested in the second round was 39.671 as opposed to
41.365 if they gained in the first round. Overall, it appears that losing made participants
willing to risk less in the second round. However, these differences are not statistically
significant. In Brazil, subjects who gained in the first round invested a higher percentage
of their money in the second round. This is possible support for the hot hand
phenomenon. US subjects invested at a higher rate in the second round if they lost in the
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first round than if they gained. A reasonable explanation for this behavior is that the
subjects who lost in the first round were trying to recoup some of their losses by investing
a higher percentage of their money in the second round. This could also be a case of
gambler’s fallacy, as the subjects could have believed that since they lost in the first
round they were less likely to lose again. Therefore, they were willing to invest at a
higher rate. Also, those
Table 8. Round 2 Investments by Round 1 Result
Round 1 Result
United States
Gain
Loss
Brazil
Gain
Loss
Overall
Gain
Loss

Mean

Standard Deviation

Number of Observations

42.224
44.290

22.381
33.597

51
27

39.952
34.249

15.886
27.619

31
23

41.365
39.671

20.098
31.096

82
50

None of these differences were significant at the 90% level

who won in the first round may not have wanted to push the odds too much and decided
that they would hold more of their first round gains rather than gamble it again in the
second round. As a note, round2percent was included as a continuous dependent variable
with round1percent as the explanatory variable using the same controls as seen in the
regression below but the result was not statistically significant. The regression was also
estimated using the amount invested in round 2 (not percentage invested) as the
dependent variable using the amount gained or lost as a control. The amount gained or
lost had a significant (at the 1% level) positive effect on the amount invested in the
second round with a value of 0.473.
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The summary statistics and averages of the subjects’ overall investment behavior
help determine if there were differences between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial
subjects. Table 9 shows the differences in the percent invested by country and
entrepreneurial status. In Brazil, one-third of the subjects were classified as
entrepreneurial compared to over half in the U.S. In both countries, subjects that were
classified as entrepreneurial invested a higher
Table 9. Average Investment Decisions by Country and Entrepreneurial
Status
Percent Invested
United States
Entrepreneurial
Non-Entrepreneurial
Brazil
Entrepreneurial*
Non-Entrepreneurial*
Overall
Entrepreneurial*
Non-Entrepreneurial*

47.87%
49.44%
46.14%
45.66%
52.68%
42.15%
46.97%
50.42%
44.17%

Std.
Number of
Dev. Observations
22.759
78
26.372
41
18.145
37
19.729
54
26.830
18
14.205
36
21.520
132
26.323
59
16.332
73

Statistically significant difference in means at the 80% level

percentage into the asset during the experiment. However, none of these differences were
statistically significant at the 90% level. This could be due in part to the small sample
size. However, the difference in the means of the overall entrepreneurial and the nonentrepreneurial are significant at the 80% level. This is evidence that individuals that are
identified as being more entrepreneurial by way of the EAO are willing to take more
financial risks. This would lend support to the Knightian view of entrepreneurship which
asserts that it is the role of the entrepreneur to assume more financial risk than the nonentrepreneur.
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Furthermore, a regression analysis was employed to determine if there was a
difference in the behavior between the subjects that were coded as entrepreneurial and
those not. In this analysis, controls for marital status, ethnicity, age, gender and location
of sessions were included. The model below was estimated using OLS with robust
standard errors. Due to collinearity, the data could not be analyzed as a panel because the
only variable that varied between rounds was investment percentage.

is a vector comprised of the following covariates: married, age, male, Black,
Asian, Moreno, Native, Other and Hispanic. The ethnicity variable white was excluded
and used as the base.
Finally,

is the indicator variable for location of the sessions, Brazil.

was different in each of the five different regressions presented in Table 10.

For regression 1,

was the indicator variable of the most interest in the study,

entrepreneurial. For regressions 2 through 5,

included one of the four subscales

innovation, achievement, control or esteem.
The primary regression of interest is regression 1. After including the covariates
in the regression, the estimated coefficient for entrepreneurial was not statistically
significant. However, see the sensitivity analysis discussion below for a closer look at the
cutoff value used to categorize the subjects as entrepreneurial or non-entrepreneurial. The
sign is in the expected direction as predicted from the statistics in Table 6. The results
were not statistically significant but see the sensitivity analysis below which shows that
this result may not be robust. The only variables that were significant in all regressions
were Native and Asian.
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Table 10. Regression Results
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
married
age
entrepreneurial
male
black
Asian
other
Moreno
native
Hispanic
Brazil
innovation

Investment
Percentage
-8.236
(7.545)
0.353
(0.362)
4.746
(3.969)
2.069
(3.971)
-7.319
(7.902)
-14.64**
(5.720)
-8.217
(11.72)
-0.808
(6.031)
-22.10***
(5.049)
-4.338
(6.521)
-5.225
(6.127)

(4)

(5)

Investment
Percentage
-9.465
(7.750)
0.396
(0.338)

Investment
Percentage
-10.03
(7.936)
0.416
(0.366)

Investment
Percentage
-8.206
(7.755)
0.363
(0.347)

Investment
Percentage
-8.844
(7.479)
0.373
(0.384)

1.599
(3.896)
-4.886
(7.296)
-11.20**
(5.432)
-6.298
(11.02)
1.799
(6.033)
-16.83***
(4.898)
-1.969
(6.204)
-3.913
(6.133)
4.621***
(1.476)

2.335
(4.005)
-7.746
(7.836)
-15.18***
(5.756)
-9.039
(11.62)
-0.939
(6.114)
-24.31***
(5.131)
-4.890
(6.643)
-7.068
(6.150)

1.626
(3.929)
-6.269
(7.717)
-13.57**
(5.651)
-7.964
(11.78)
-0.00935
(6.048)
-22.39***
(5.098)
-3.966
(6.512)
-4.149
(6.170)

3.072
(4.089)
-7.250
(7.041)
-14.93***
(5.438)
-8.114
(11.99)
-1.047
(6.130)
-23.96***
(5.063)
-3.596
(6.681)
-5.439
(6.079)

1.336
(1.580)

achievement

2.206*
(1.138)

control
esteem
Constant
Observations
R-squared

42.08***
11.67
33.53**
(8.460)
(13.23)
(15.51)
132
132
132
0.101
0.163
0.094
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

28.86**
(12.32)
132
0.114

2.748
(2.285)
30.92**
(12.43)
132
0.100

Male subjects and older subjects invested at a higher percentage than their
counterparts. Male subjects may be more accustomed to making financially risky
decisions. This supports the previous literature that states males are less risk averse.
However, in this sample, older individuals were also less risk averse. These results of age
cannot be compared to the other studies cited here because there was low variance in the
ages of the subjects. Married subjects and the subjects from Brazil invested less, on
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average, than their counterparts. Married individuals may have more to lose when taking
financial risks and that could have led to the lower investment rate. These results are
consistent with the bulk of the literature examining marital status and risk aversion,
suggesting married individuals are more risk averse.
Regressions 2 through 5 did not include the entrepreneurial variable. Here it was
more interesting to look at the effects the subscale scores would have on subjects’
investment decisions. Of the four scores, the only two that were significant at at least the
10% level were innovation and control. All four of the scores were associated with higher
investment percentages. The innovation score questions related to perceiving and acting
upon business activities in new and unique ways. To be innovative, one must take risks. It
is not always the case that these are financial risks but in this experiment higher
innovation was associated with higher investments in the risky asset. The control score
questions were concerning the individual's perception of control and influence over his or
her business. This perception of control could have not only been seen in their business
decisions but may also have been obvious in their control of other decisions. The subjects
with higher control scores may have felt that they had more control of the outcomes and
invested at a higher rate.
Finally, Table 11 gives a simple look at the differences of means of the
entrepreneurial score between the US and Brazil subjects. The table below shows that this
difference is significant at the 5% level.
Table 11. Differences in Entrepreneurial Score
Number of
Mean
Std. Dev
Observations
0.333*
0.476
54
Brazil
0.526*
0.503
78
US
Statistically significant difference in means at the 80% level
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For a sensitivity analysis, the cutoff for entrepreneurial was varied by one
standard deviation above the comparative norm and one standard deviation below and
found that the sign for the coefficient of percent invested stayed the same. Importantly,
using this definition of entrepreneurial attitude, the coefficient on the variable became
statistically significant. Sign is not sensitive but the difference is measured with greater
precision and thus the null that the two groups are the same is rejected. This lends more
support to the results that were previewed earlier, in which the subjects that were more
entrepreneurial were more likely to invest in the risky asset at a higher percentage. Table
12 shows the value of the cutoff at one standard deviation above and below with the
coefficient and summary statistics.
Table 12. Sensitivity Analysis of Entrepreneurial Indicator
Coefficient of Percentage
Std.
Value
Mean
Invested
Dev.
Comparative
0.447
0.499
6.5
4.746
Norm
One σ above
7.3
0.106
0.309
17.010*
One σ below
5.7
8.972**
0.765
0.426
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As a final method of looking at the data, a Wald test helped determine if
entrepreneurial and Brazil were statistically different from zero. The null that
entrepreneurial and Brazil were significantly different from zero at the 1% level could
not be rejected. Therefore, the results, which suggest that the entrepreneurial subjects did
not invest differently in the risky asset relative to the non-entrepreneurial subjects, are
highly sensitive to the value used to categorize a participant as entrepreneurial or not.
This test does not give us a sign value; it simply indicates whether the variables of
interest have a significant impact in the model. Referring to the summary statistics and
sensitivity analysis allows for the inference that the more entrepreneurial subjects
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invested at a higher rate relative to the non-entrepreneurial participants, even though the
initial regression results did not support this hypothesis.
Given the results above, the hypotheses are revisited and the findings summarizes.
H1:

There will be no difference in risk aversion between U.S. and Brazil

subjects.
U.S. subjects invested an average of 47.87% of their lab money and the subjects
from Brazil invested an average of 45.66%. However, this relationship did not hold once
the differences between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial subjects in the two
countries were examined. The entrepreneurial subjects in Brazil invested an average of
52.68% as opposed to 49.44% average investment for the U.S. subjects. But the nonentrepreneurial subjects in the U.S. invested, on average, more than the Brazilian
subjects: 46.14% compared to 42.15%. However, bear in mind that even though these
differences in average investment exist, they were not significantly different from each
other.
H2:

Women will be more risk averse.

No significant differences between genders were found, however, the coefficient
on male was positive, pointing to the possibility that males invested at a higher
percentage, therefore were less risk averse.
H3:

Older subjects will be more risk averse.

No support for this hypothesis was evident. This could be due to such a low
variance in the age variable.
H4:

Married subjects will be more risk averse.
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Even though the sign on the married variable was negative throughout all the
regression results, this was not statistically significant. Therefore, no support for the
hypothesis that married individuals are more risk averse was found.
H5:

There will be no difference in the entrepreneurial values between

countries.
A significance test for the differences in the mean of the U.S. entrepreneurial
score and the Brazil entrepreneurial score showed that the difference is significant at the
95% level. However, a lower percentage of the Brazilian subjects were categorized as
entrepreneurial. This does not support the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey
results which suggest that Brazilians are more entrepreneurial than Americans.
H6:

More entrepreneurial subjects will be less risk averse.

The difference in the means of the percentage invested was statistically significant
at the 80% level. In the regression, the entrepreneurial variable carried no statistical
significance. However, adjusting how subjects were categorized as entrepreneurial led to
a different conclusion because adjusting how subjects were categorized as entrepreneurial
led to a different conclusion. If the cutoff value for the entrepreneurial variable was
changed by one standard deviation above or below the comparative norm then there is
support for this hypothesis. Within one standard deviation above the comparative norm,
entrepreneurial subjects were less risk averse at the 90% significance level. Within one
standard deviation below, entrepreneurial subjects were less risk averse at the 95%
significance level.
H7:

Subjects that won in the first round will wager a higher percentage in the
second round
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This hypothesis was developed to test for the existence of the hot hand or house
money phenomena. Possible evidence of this phenomenon existed in the Brazilian
sample. In the Brazilian sample, subjects that won in the first round were willing to invest
at a higher percentage in the second round than those who lost. However, these
differences were not statistically significant and this could be due to such a low sample
size in the Brazil data. The opposite was true among the U.S. subjects. Those who lost in
the first round invested at a higher rate in the second round. This lends support to the
gambler’s fallacy. It is possible that the subjects that lost in the first round thought that it
could not happen again. However, once again, these differences were not statistically
significant at the 90% level.
Conclusion
Experiments conducted in the United States and Brazil suggest differences in the
financial risk taking behavior between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial subjects.
Subjects who were identified as entrepreneurial were likely to invest more of their money
from the experiment into a risky asset. Entrepreneurial subjects in Brazil invested a
higher percentage of his or her money than entrepreneurial subjects in the U.S. Another
interesting finding is that the behavior of subjects who gained or lost from their first
round investment in Brazil behaved differently in the second round of play when
compared to their correspondents in the U.S. In Brazil, subjects that gained in their first
round investment were willing to invest at a higher percentage in the second round
compared to those that lost. This lends support to the either the hot hand phenomenon or
the house money phenomenon because they were betting with won money. This design
did not allow us to distinguish between the two. In the U.S., subjects that lost in the first
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round invested at an even higher rate in the second round, suggesting the existence of the
gambler’s fallacy. This could also simply be a result of subjects trying to recoup some of
the money lost in the first round by investing even more in the second. These results
support Knight’s belief that there is a difference in the financial risk taking behavior
between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial subjects. Therefore, subsidizing start-up
costs may stimulate entrepreneurial entry.
One of the main weaknesses of this study, which leads to a possible extension of
the study in the future, is that we only categorized individuals as entrepreneurial or not.
The experiment was not conducted on actual entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, which
could give a more clear indication as to whether a difference in their financial risk taking
behavior exists. It can also be argued that the EAO is not a valid tool for categorizing the
subjects, regardless of its previously found validity and reliability.
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CHAPTER 3
TAX EVASION: A MACROECONOMIC THEORETICAL EXAMINATION
Abstract
Informal activities are looked upon by most governments as a loss in potential revenue.
This chapter presents a variety of literature about the state of the informal sector from
around the world and how many researchers attempt to measure and define this sector.
An extension of the Ramsey model is presented that includes an income tax and a
parameter that allows for the evasion of part or all of those taxes. The model shows the
decrease in government revenue and long term levels of consumption and capital.
However, the growth rate of capital and consumption remains unaffected by informal
activities. The model does not include any assumptions about how individuals will
choose to spend the money they save by evading taxes.
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Introduction
Entrepreneurship is known to be a driver of economic growth and innovation
within an economy. At the heart of entrepreneurial ventures is the entrepreneur.
Entrepreneurs have many difficult decisions to make as they decide to start their own
venture and the decision making continues as they begin operating the firm. This chapter
focuses on one of those decisions, which is, do I participate in the formal or the informal
sector of the economy? An entrepreneur can participate in informal activities in a variety
of manners, for example, hiring informal labor, buying informal inputs, selling in
informal markets, evading taxes, etc. Governments have tried over time to discourage
these types of activities, even though there may be a degree of informal activity that
contributes significantly to economic growth.
A major argument as to why individuals decide to become self-employed, or
entrepreneurs, is because of the ease at which they can avoid paying taxes. Falsifying
income and botching deductions are just a couple of the ways in which it may be easier to
evade taxes as a self-employed individual. Often times, small businesses may receive
payments in cash and this income is difficult to trace, therefore it is difficult to prove that
tax evasion is taking place. One way to check this is to see if the reported income is lower
or higher than the expenses the business has. If the reported income is lower but all of the
expenses are being paid then the extra income to cover the difference is assumed to be
unreported. The model in this chapter uses the basic Ramsey model for income taxes and
adds a parameter that allow for different levels of tax evasion. The model shows that tax
evasion decreases government revenue, levels of capital and consumption but does not
affect the long term growth rate in the economy.
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The literature review in this chapter does not directly focus on tax evasion as the
sole informal economic activity. The point was to cover the landscape of informal
economic activities throughout the world and use the theoretical model to show one
example of how a certain informal activity can affect the macroeconomic indicators in an
economy. The chapter continues with a broad overview of topics relating to informal
economic activities and how these activities have been measured, debated and possibly
supported. Even as this is not an empirical chapter, the literature review begins with a
presentation and review of some of the studies that have attempted to measure and define
informal activities. It continues by looking at the multiple intersections between public
policy and the informal economy. As this chapter primarily focuses on the behavior of
entrepreneurs, a discussion of informal entrepreneurship is presented. The debate as to
whether informal entrepreneurship is healthy for an economy is briefly discussed in that
section as well. The review then continues to give a broad overview of the state and size
of informal economies from all over the world, including papers on Italy, the U.S.,
Nigeria, Brazil, just to name a few. The review concludes with a look at tax evasion
among the self-employed and entrepreneurs.
Defining and estimating the informal sector
Finding the data to measure the informal sector is extremely difficult because, by
definition, formal data do not exist. Participants in the informal sector are working
outside of the formal measurable employment sectors. There have been three major
avenues taken to measure the size of the informal economy: using cash demand timeseries analysis; difference between aggregate total incomes and total expenditures; and
differences between micro-level income and expenditure (Albu, Kim, & Duchene, 2002).
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Another issue in measuring this sector arises from the inconsistent definitions of informal
economic activity. Does this include illegal transactions? What is the difference between
informal employment and employment in the informal sector? How do you measure
something that is not well defined? There has been a progression of the “official”
definition of the informal economy. This progression was briefly presented in
Hussmanns’ (2004) working paper. A fact finding study, published by Sida, reports three
different discourses for defining the informal economy (Becker, 2004). They include: the
dualists’ approach that defines the informal economy as separate from the formal
economy and is not directly linked to it and it provides a safety net for lower income
people; the structuralists’ approach views the informal economy as subordinate to the
formal; and the legalists’ discourse discusses the informal economy as informal work
arrangements made by entrepreneurs in response to bureaucracy.
In 1993, a statistical definition of the informal economy was included in the
System of National Accounts. The informal sector, as quoted in British English, was
“broadly characterised as comprising production units that operate on a small scale and at
a low level of organisation, with little or no division between labour and capital as factors
of production, and with the primary objective of generating income and employment for
the persons concerned” (Informal Sector - SNA). This was defined under the context that
“the [informal] sector is defined on a country specific basis as the set of
unincorporated enterprises owned by households which produce at least some
products for the market but which either have less than a specified number of
employees and/or are not registered under national legislation referring, for
example, to tax or social security obligations, or regulatory acts” (Informal Sector
- SNA).
This definition allowed researchers to more accurately estimate the contribution of the
informal sector to GDP across countries. However, there were many criticisms offered to
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this definition as outlined by Hussmanns (2004). For example, casual self-employment or
persons involved with small-scale activities may not report self-employment and
therefore they are not considered as part of the formal sector as they should be. This
would lead to overestimation of informal activities. Another criticism is that persons
existing in the borderlands between self-employment and wage employment may also
cause an error in estimation. A third criticism is that the enterprise-based definition does
not capture all aspects of informal employment. As a result, the International Labour
Office began to differentiate between the employment in the formal sector and informal
employment. For a more rich discussion on this process of definition development see the
International Labour Office’s (2002) report.
With all the difficulties of defining what exactly is the informal sector and if that
is different from the informal economy, measuring informal activity remains just as
illusive. Schneider (2004) presents different methods to estimating the size of the
informal economy. He presents the direct approach and many variations of an indirect
approach. The direct approach is a micro approach that utilizes surveys and samples. This
approach is widely used in many European countries and is useful because of the detailed
information that can be extracted about the structure of the informal economy. However,
as with most survey data, the results are highly sensitive to the design of the surveys.
Another direct approach that Schneider mentions is based on the inconsistencies between
tax returns and actual checks received. Auditing can catch these inconsistencies and this
undeclared income is often assumed to be received through conducting informal
economic activities. These direct approaches, however detailed the data, are unlikely to
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capture all informal activities because cash transactions are not accounted for in this
approach if the cash transactions are not claimed on individual tax returns.
Schneider also outlines five macroeconomic indicator, or indirect, approaches.
First are the inconsistencies between National Expenditure and Income Statistics.
Theoretically, the income measure of GNP and the expenditure measure of GNP should
be equal. If they are not then national accounts statisticians use this gap as an indicator of
the size of the informal economy. The second is the differences in the sizes of the
“official” and the “actual” labor force, where, often times, a decrease in labor force
participation in the formal economy can be attributed to an increase in informal labor
force participation. This is valid if the total labor force participation rate remains
constant. Of course, unemployment could also be a viable explanation for the decrease in
formal labor participation rates. Thirdly, he presents an approach utilized and described
by Feige (1996), the transactions approach. The main assumption of this approach is a
constant relation between volume of transaction and official GNP over time.
Mathematically, the velocity of money times the amount of money must be equal to
prices times total transactions. To extract the size of the informal economy using this
approach there has to be a base year with no informal economy. Then subtracting the
official GNP form the total nominal GNP will give an estimate for the size of the
informal economy. One obvious weakness of this approach is assuming a base year with
no informal economy and the normalization of the ratio of transactions to nominal GNP.
The fourth approach he describes is the currency demand approach. This approach was
originally used by Cagan (1958) and further developed by Tanzi (1980). The currency
demand function, a correlation of currency demand and tax pressure, is estimated to
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calculate the size of the informal economy. This approach assumes that informal
activities are cash payment transactions. To estimate the currency demand function,
controls are added for government regulation, tax system complexity and federal tax
burden. The dependent variable used by Tanzi (1983) is the log of the ratio of cash
holding to current and deposit accounts. This is a very commonly used estimation
approach but is criticized because not all informal transactions are cash payments and
that the velocity of money is assumed to be the same in the formal and informal
economies. The fifth and final indirect approach presented by Schneider (2004) is the
physical input approach. There are two variations of this method; one is used and further
developed by Kaufmann & Kaliberda (1996) and the other was developed, as an
improvement to Kaufmann & Kaliderda’s method, by Lackó (1998). Kaufmann &
Kaliberda use electric power consumption as the best indicator of economic activity,
whether it is formal or informal. By using the growth of electricity consumption as a
proxy for GDP growth and subtracting measured GDP growth then they have a
measurement of the growth and size of the informal economy. Finally Lackó (1998) also
assumes that a certain part of electricity consumption can be attributed to informal
economy activities. These methods have been criticized because not all informal
activities require a considerable amount of electricity and that informal activities also
take place outside of the household sector.
Studies use a wide variety of terms to represent informal activity including
informal employment, informal sector, informal economy, underground economy, the
illegal economy, unreported economy, unrecorded economy, the black market etc. Feige
(1990) presents a clear definition of many of these concepts. This review will focus more
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broadly on presenting the papers that attempted measure informal activity, however it
may be defined.
As stated earlier, one often used approach for measuring the size of the informal
economy is using household level data. Albu, Kim & Duchene (2002) analyzed data from
a supplemental survey5 to the Integrated Household Survey in Romania by computing a
composite coefficient for all households in the sample. Their sample size was 288 and
they characterized two different types of activity, main and secondary. This
categorization was based on a specific question in the survey that asked about the ratio of
main activity to secondary activity. They used this information to create an absolute
measure of households’ income that resulted from secondary activity. Then they took the
difference between the incomes earned from the two different types of activities to
measure informal activity. They estimated that households’ participation in informal
activities ranged between 20.4% and 30.6%.
Other approaches include a cross country analysis where countries are divided
into categories such as developed, developing and underdeveloped. In an IZA Discussion
Paper, Schneider (2004) does just that by categorizing countries into developing,
transition, highly-developed OECD, southwest Pacific Islands and communist countries.
Schneider used the DYMIMIC (Dynamic Multiple-Indicators Multiple-Causes) approach,
which he developed, to estimate the size of the informal economy in 145 countries. He
admits that one major disadvantage of this approach is that you can only estimate relative
sizes of the shadow economy not the absolute size. One motivation for this approach is
that he does not assume that informal activities show up in only one sector of the

5

This supplemental survey was called the Supplemental Survey on Household Informal Economic
Activities with a sample size of 2,600 households.
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economy and can be seen in production, labor and money markets. The approach is based
on the statistical theory of unobserved variables and the informal economy is estimated
using a factor-analytic approach. He includes indicators for the money, labor and
production markets. This method has been further utilized by Giles & Tedds (2002).
Table 13 shows a summary of his results using the DYMIMIC and currency demand
method. Ruge (2010) also takes a cross country perspective and is more focused on the
determinants of the informal economy but also estimates the size. Using a structural
equation model, he examined panel data from 38 countries over a 17 year period
spanning the years 1991-2007. The dataset included around 470 variables. The model is
similar to a multiple regressions model that describes a linear relationship between latent
variables, bivariate correlations and errors. The determinants of the informal economy
were placed into three categories: Overall state, tax system and labor system. The overall
state included three wealth and development indicators, fourteen administrative indicators
and eleven constitutional trust and value indicators. He assumes that as a better “overall
state” reduces the size of the informal sector. The tax system variables included seven tax
and social security payments indicators, six tax complexity and surveillance indicators
and two tax moral indicators. The final group, the labor system, included four labor
market indicator variables, one unemployment indicator, three participation right
indicators and two wage indicators. The results suggest that a higher wealth and
development level, a better administrative system, lower taxes and social security
payments, higher tax complexity and surveillance and more regulated labor markets
reduce the size of the informal economy. New Zealand was found to have the smallest
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informal economy, Romania the largest and the U.S. ranked 12 out of the 35 countries 6
analyzed.
Table 13. Size of Informal Economy as a Percentage of Official GDP

Region/Category
1999-2000
7
Central and South America
41.1
8
Asia
28.9
9
Africa
41.3
10
Europe and Former Soviet
38.1
11
OECD
16.8
Pacific Islands12
31.7
13
Communist Countries
19.4
Figures reported are unweighted averages
Source: (Schneider F. , 2004)

Years
2001-2002
42.2
29.9
42.3
39.1
16.7
32.6
20.7

2002-2003
43.4
30.8
43.2
40.1
16.3
33.4
21.8

6

New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden,
Japan, United States, Ireland, France, Austria, Germany, Belgium, Slovenia, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus,
Republic of Korea, Estonia, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Italy, Hungary, Greece, Poland, Lithuania,
Turkey, Mexico, Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania. This list is ordered from smallest to largest according to
Ruge (2010).
7

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay
and Venezuela
8

Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Republic of
Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
9

Algeria, Angola, Benin Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
10

Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovinian, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine and
Uzbekistan.
11

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
12

Fiji, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and
Vanuatu
13

China, Lao, Mongolia and Vietnam
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Public policy and the informal economy
One common belief is that governments should strive to reduce the size of the
informal economy. When many entrepreneurs and laborers operate in the informal
economy, the government is losing out on tax revenue because most of the earnings and
revenues generated in this sector are not reported on tax returns. This potential loss of
revenue could stifle the economy and inhibit growth rates. Therefore, many governments
strive to reduce the size of the informal economy. Also, production in the informal
economy could be an inefficient use of resources where market forces are not strong
enough to incentivize efficient resource allocation. Peattie (1987) appropriately notes that
we should be careful in our stigmatizing perception of the informal economy. There are
quite successful informal entrepreneurs and there are underpaid formal wage earners.
Roger Smith (2002) suggests that
“in a world of minimum wages, high payroll taxes, immigration and employment
controls, limits on hours worked, and clawbacks of social transfers, the
underground economy may enable some individuals to be employed who would
otherwise not be employed, enable other individuals to increase their incomes by
holding second jobs, and provide services that would otherwise be unavailable.”
As it is, the interaction between public policy and the informal economy is complex and
researchers have approached the topic from a wide variety of angles.
The U.S. government has increased the IRS penalties on unpaid tax liabilities and
has increased their audit rates in order to deter informal economic activities. Cebula
(1997) uses data on the size of the informal economy, generated by Dr. Edgar Feige,
combined with official IRS tax data to determine if audit rates, tax rates and tax penalties
are associated with the size of the informal economy in the U.S. In his ordinary least
squares model, the Feige estimate for the size of the underground economy is as a
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percentage of annual adjusted gross income against: the maximum marginal federal
personal income tax rate from the previous year, the average effective federal corporate
income tax rate from the previous year, the percentage of income tax returns that was
subjected to an audit from the previous year and the expected average penalty from
underreporting income from the previous two years. He also included a simple linear
trend variable. In all specifications of the model, the results show that the higher the
maximum federal personal income tax rate, the larger the relative size of the informal
economy. He also finds that the higher the IRS audit rate, the smaller the relative size of
the informal economy. Finally, he finds that the greater the expected penalty for
underreporting, the smaller the relative size of the informal economy.
Ihrig and Moe (2004) set up a dynamic theoretical model to more closely examine
how the informal economy evolves over time, particularly in response to policy changes.
An agent is endowed with an initial capital stock and accumulates capital over time. The
agent can choose to participate in the formal or informal economy. Formal production is
always taxed by the government but the informal is only taxed when the authorities
become aware of this production. One of the main differences in the production process
is that formal producers employ labor and capital but informal only employ labor. The
two-way causality between real GDP per capita and the size of the informal economy
analysis suggests that reducing the tax rate can increase standard of living and help move
people out of the informal sector into the formal sector. The authors believe that more
resources in the economy does not reduce informal participation as much as decreasing
the tax rate or increasing the tax penalty.
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One theory is that heavy bureaucracy and high tax burden forces producers to
partake in informal economic activities. Azuma and Grossman (2008) study this
possibility by looking at producer endowments and the quality of public services and
their effects on the informal economic participation. One of their theoretical models
contains well-endowed producers, poorly endowed producers, and private substitutes for
public services. They assume a Cobb-Douglas combination of resources and the marginal
rate of substitution for the production function in the informal section is equal to the
marginal rate of substitution for the aggregate production function in the formal sector.
They also allow producers, both well and poorly endowed, to work in the informal
economy by offering private substitutes for public services. One example would be
worker compensation. The model also allows the State to extract from production,
however imposing the restriction that the amount extracted in the formal economy cannot
be easily altered. Two different assumptions are made about producers’ endowments,
from the State’s perspective: observable and non-observable. Non-observable
endowments include knowledge, skills, etc. They find that if well-endowed producer
endowments are relatively large enough or if the quality of public services is low enough
then the State will extract large amounts from the formal producers. This leads poorly
endowed producers to participate in the informal economy. This result is also based on
the assumption that the State maximizes its own revenue. This result can be important
when examining why the informal economy tends to be larger in poorer countries. This
study suggests that it could be due to the large information asymmetry between the State
and producers in developing and underdeveloped countries.
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Dijkstra (2011) presents a theoretical model which tests to see if an economy can
have a “good” and a “bad” equilibrium. A bad equilibrium was characterized by a small
formal sector with high taxes as opposed to the good equilibrium, small informal sector
and low taxes. The theoretical model includes a continuum of workers that sum to one:
Workers in the formal sector, workers in the informal sector and workers in the public
sector. It is assumed that each worker is full-time in only one sector at any given
moment; however a worker can switch sectors over time. It could be argued that someone
could be a full-time worker in the formal sector, and at the same time, participate in the
informal sector. The public sector produces a good and the formal sector produces a good
which is consumed by everyone. These two goods are equal. However, the informal
sector produces a fraction of this good because they are not able to reap the benefits of all
public goods, for example, informal producers cannot benefit from the legal system,
social insurance and medical insurance enjoyed by the formal sector participants. The
government levies a tax on production of the formal sector and uses this to pay the public
sector workers. The author assumes an implicit tax rate in the informal economy. The rate
at which the informal economy increases over time is proportional to the difference
between the informal sector and average payoffs. When the economy is in equilibrium,
no worker wants to switch sectors. The government maximizes an objective function that
combines the welfare of formal and informal workers and the rate at which the informal
economy decreases. The author goes on to present situations of multiple equilibria. The
model suggests that when the informal sector is large, the government implements a low
tax rate which intends to increase the attractiveness of the formal sector. However, as the
government raises taxes to discourage workers from entering the informal economy, the
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opposite happens. More workers are led to the informal economy and this makes all
workers in the economy worse off. Therefore, a tension exists between short run and long
run worker welfare.
Another intersection of policy and the informal sector is government corruption
and inequality reduction. Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2012) compiled inequality data
from the United Nations Worlds Income Inequality Database, corruption measures from
the International Country Risk Guide index and corruption perception index, and
informal economic measures previously presented in the literature. The informal sector
variable is measured as a percentage of GDP. They also included data from the Penn
World tables and the World Bank. Their regression includes inequality as the dependent
variable and the explanatory variables of interest are the two estimates for inequality,
estimates of the size of the informal economy and the two corruption indexes. The
regression also includes controls for per capita real output, secondary school enrollment,
domestic private sector credit, openness measures, agricultural production and inflation.
The results show a link between inequality, the formal sector and corruption. Their
findings imply that in an economy with a large informal sector, anti-corruption policies
are unlikely to reduce inequality. They suggest that allowing corruption to grow in
countries with weak institutions and large informal sectors may be beneficial, however,
this should not be the first option explored.
Informal entrepreneurship
Schumpeter believed that the entrepreneur should be considered a major factor in
economic development. He does not distinguish between formal and informal
entrepreneurs. The consequences (or benefits) from informal entrepreneurship is a
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debatable topic. On the one hand, informal entrepreneurs avoid paying formal taxes on
their earnings and therefore the government is losing out on revenue that could be used
for infrastructure improvements, education and public services. Also, informal
entrepreneurs have less market forces and may be operating at an inefficient level and the
market does not incentivize more efficient operations. This leads to a misuse of resources
that could be more favorably employed in the formal sector. On the other hand, some
suggest that informal entrepreneurship, especially in Central and South America, is a
source of accelerated economic development (Pisani & Patrick, 2002). Informal
entrepreneurs are often very dynamic and have high innovative capabilities that are not
supported or may even be hampered in the formal economic sector. These informal
enterprises also offer employment options and income to those that may not have access
to formal options. Many enterprises that operate in the formal sector do so by exploiting
workers by overworking and underpaying them. This has often been the perception of the
informal sector but that trend is changing and many researchers and policymakers are
beginning to recognize the informal economy as “a hidden enterprise culture” (De Soto,
1989).
Before going too much further, it should be emphasized that it is difficult to
define the concept of an informal entrepreneur. Firstly, there are many definitions of an
entrepreneur used in the literature. For example, an entrepreneur has been defined as
someone who innovates and introduces new goods or methods of production
(Schumpeter, 1934), someone who discovers previously unnoticed opportunities to make
a profit (Kirzner, 1973), someone that is actively involved in starting a business or is the
owner of a business that has been operating less than 42 months (Harding, et al., 2006);
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someone that organizes labor, land and capital (Bade & Parkin, 2009) and “an individual
who creates new economic enterprises” (Frank & Bernanke, 2001). It is important to note
that all of the definitions above, and most that are presented in other literature, view the
entrepreneur in a positive light.
An entrepreneur is presented as an important factor in the economy that adds to
economic growth, increases employment opportunities and creatively combines factors of
production. However, this is counter to the view of the informal economy, in general.
Therefore, is an informal entrepreneur a useful agent in the economy that should be
supported? Since, the informal economy itself is hard to identify and define, it is unclear
how to define and/or recognize an informal entrepreneur. Williams & Nadin (2010)
review some of the literature that attempts to define an informal entrepreneur. The
definition that they use is an informal entrepreneur is “somebody actively engaged in
starting a business or is the owner/manager of a business that is less than 42 months old
who participates in the paid production and sale of goods and services that are legitimate
in all respects besides the fact that they are unregistered by, or hidden from the state for
tax and/or benefit purposes”. Schneider & Enste (2002) presented results from an
international survey which surprised many believers that informal sectors are a sign of
economic weakness. They suggested that, even in OECD countries, the informal sector
generates up to 20% of their GDP. Bureau (2011) suggests that informal entrepreneurship
can create value and that equilibrium-based understandings of this sector do not allow us
to understand the complexity of this type of entrepreneurship. Webb et al. (2009) set out
to integrate entrepreneurship theory, institutional frameworks and collective identity to
examine informal entrepreneurship. The study was needed because the literature lacks a
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theoretical look at informal entrepreneurship combining macro, micro and meso level
theory. In their multidisciplinary study, they suggested that at the macro level, the
incongruence between the formal and informal institutions, created by the regulation of
market activity, creates the opportunity for informal transactions and these transactions
may be illegal but should not be considered unbeneficial
On the other hand, not all researchers have the positive view of entrepreneurship
as Fortune magazine. For example, drug dealers (Bouchard & Dion, 2009), pimps and
prostitutes (Smith & Christou, 2009) all show characteristics and ways of doing business
that is similar to how an entrepreneur operates and behaves. Rehn & Taalas (2004)
examine a communist economy, the Soviet Union, and infers that this is an
entrepreneurial economy if you accept a wider definition of an entrepreneur. They assert
that if an entrepreneur is viewed as someone that searches “for opportunities and
beneficial outcomes in economic transactions” then nearly “every citizen of the Soviet
Union” can be classified as an entrepreneur. They also imply that this type of
entrepreneurship can be “subversive and anti-systematic” and the conventional capitalist
view that entrepreneurs are “bucking the system” does not have to be viewed as a
positive trait. Actually, studies are rare that categorize this entrepreneurial behavior as
“against the prevailing social order”.
Williams & Nadin (2011) summarize four theoretical views of informal
entrepreneurship. Without going into great detail, here are the basic premises for each
perspective. The leftover perspective posits that informal entrepreneurship is leftover
from earlier production modes and is now disappearing. This perspective implies that
informal entrepreneurship is representative of underdevelopment and that formal level
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entrepreneurship shows economic progress. The survivalist perspective positions
informal entrepreneurship as a new mode of production comprised of unregulated
employment, particularly in situations where workers are exploited and have dangerous
work environments. The informal entrepreneurs, under this perspective, were
marginalized by and/or excluded from the formal economy and are nothing but pawns
being exploited by the global economic system. The alternative perspective suggests that
informal entrepreneurship is nothing more than a substitute for formal economic
participation where a potential entrepreneur has the choice to join the formal or informal
economy. Neo-liberals suggested that informal entrepreneurship, as viewed through this
lens, is a choice of resistance against heavy regulation of the formal economy. However,
there are modern hypothesis that support this perspective but believe the motivation of
the entrepreneurs could be due to social resistance against corruption. Finally, the
complementary perspective views informal entrepreneurship and formal economic
participation as complementary, where the two sectors expand and contract together at
both the macro and micro levels. The macro argument is that earnings from the informal
sector are spent in the formal sector. At the micro level, those who benefit from one
sector are also the ones who reap benefit from the other. The idea here is that informal
entrepreneurs’ informal activities are a direct result of the formal economy and the
informal sector helps alleviate the disparities of the formal economy. Williams & Nadin
took these four perspectives and wanted to determine which one best explains informal
entrepreneurship in rural England. After surveying 350 households, they determined that
neither of the perspectives could adequately explain informal entrepreneurship as a
whole. Each participant had varying motivations for their informal activities and the
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results showed the complexity involved in developing a theory of informal
entrepreneurship.
There is extensive literature on necessity versus opportunity driven
entrepreneurship (Acs, Arenius, Hay, & Minniti, 2005); (Jörn & Sandner, 2009); (Maritz,
2004). The basic difference between these two types of entrepreneurs is their motivations
for choosing entrepreneurship over wage earning. A necessity based entrepreneur
believes they have no options available in the employment market and decide to start
their own business. Many of these types of entrepreneurs are thought to be small service
providers or offer inexpensive goods for resale. An opportunity based entrepreneur
chooses to start their own business because they see an opportunity in the market to offer
something new and innovative that is not currently readily available. It is thought that
these types of entrepreneurs offer more to the market in terms of employment
opportunities and innovation. Necessity versus opportunity driven is also thought of as
pushed versus pulled entrepreneurs. Necessity driven entrepreneurs are pushed into
entrepreneurship because of the lack of satisfactory formal labor market work and the
opportunity driven are pulled into the entrepreneurship in hopes of exploiting a gap in the
market.
Are the entrepreneurs operating in the informal economy doing so out of necessity
or because of an opportunity? It is often assumed that informal entrepreneurs, especially
in emerging economies, are choosing to participate, wholly or partly, in informal
activities out of necessity (Valliere & Peterson, 2009). However, Williams (2007)
investigates this question and finds that necessity is not the principal motivation for
informal entrepreneurs in the UK. He suggests that the ratio of opportunity to necessity

87

driven entrepreneurs is not much different in the informal sector than it is in the formal
sector. Williams admits that this dualism is an oversimplification of informal
entrepreneurs’ motives. Many of the entrepreneurs who participated in his survey were
both pushed and pulled into participating in informal entrepreneurial activities. Temkin
(2009) conducted a study to determine whether informal self-employment in Mexico was
a symptom of inequality and poverty or, instead, a space that flourishes with economic
initiative and business potential. He analyzed data from the 2005 edition of the Mexican
Version of the World Value Survey, an attitudinal survey. As a background for Mexico,
informal employment has been estimated as high as 60% of the total employment.
Temkin isolated the 796 respondents that reported themselves as employed at the time of
the survey and were at least 18 years of age. The survey questions allowed for different
levels of informality to be assessed. The level of informality was estimated based on
whether the individual had a formal employment contract, had social security or worked
in economic units that did not issue official receipts. He divided the informal participants
into either workers or self-employed. His findings suggest that informal entrepreneurs in
Mexico choose to be so out of necessity and are characterized by “precariousness,
vulnerability and insecurity” (Temkin, 2009). Therefore, he concludes that informal
entrepreneurs in Mexico are not drivers of economic growth and he suggests that
policymakers in Mexico should not set their hopes “on the possibility of economic
growth and alleviation of poverty based on the entrepreneurship and initiative of the
informal participants of the economy” (Temkin, 2009). Gurtoo (2009) asks whether the
informal economy in India happens in the form of a hidden enterprise culture or out of
necessity. The data included results from a survey conducted over a seven month span in
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2006-07, which intended to investigate India’s informal sector. The questionnaire was
administered face-to-face to approximately 1,500 workers. They found that informal
entrepreneurs were happy in their work and did not choose to be informally employed
because of lack of formal employment options. The author suggests that India should
support informal entrepreneurs with sound policy structures by helping them with “skills
and strategy development, financial support through easy credit and cooperative
programs for welfare” (Gurtoo, 2009). Morris & Pitt (1995) suggest something similar
about informal entrepreneurship in South Africa. They believe that these entrepreneurs
are dynamic, create employment opportunities and are opportunity driven.
Günther and Launov (2012) also visit the topic of whether informal employment
happens because the informal sector is attractive or if participation in this sector is of last
resort. This is very similar to the ideas of “push” versus “pull” entrepreneurship. Günther
and Launov constructed an empirical model that included a wage equation, a Heckman
selection bias correction, a distribution of observed wages and a probabilistic distribution
of individuals across competitive market sectors. The sectorial distribution allowed them
to apply probabilities to show whether a given individual chose to engage in informal
activities as a result of market segmentation or as a result of comparative advantage
considerations. Using household data from a 1998 survey, the Enquê te de Niveau de vie,
administered in Côte d’ Ivoire, the authors found that many of the informal workers
would be better off if they participated in a different segment of the labor market.
However, they also find that many informal workers have a comparative advantage in the
informal sector. Therefore, they conclude that it is not beneficial to look at this labor
choice through the dual choice lens. It may be advantageous for some workers to
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participate in the informal sector because market segmentation and for others because this
segment offers a comparative advantage.
Williams & Round (2007) aim to determine the rate at which formal business
ventures in the Ukraine participated in the informal economy when they were start-ups.
The data from a direct survey, 600 face-to-face interviews, conducted in 2005 and 2006,
showed that 331 of the individuals surveyed started an enterprise within the last three
years. This was a surprisingly high rate of entrepreneurial activities. Of these 331
respondents, only about ten percent of the individuals reported that all of their activities
operated in the formal sector. Hence, ninety percent of the entrepreneurs admitted a high
dependence on the informal sector for support when starting their operations. Nearly twothirds admitted to not properly registering their venture, not applying for the appropriate
licenses, etc. Of these 298 informal entrepreneurs, fifty-one percent operated completely
off the books; they had no license and were unregistered. This leads to a discrepancy in
the formal data for estimating the entrepreneurial activity taking place in Ukraine. From
this survey, over half of all start-ups operate wholly in the informal sector and eighty
percent operate at least partly in the informal sector.
Informal economies around the world
As described above, the informal economy is often associated with
underdevelopment, a lack of formal employment options and corruption. If this were the
case then informal economic activities would be isolated to regions such as certain areas
of Latin America and Africa. However, that is not the case. Countries such as Italy and
the United States have shown a thriving informal sector, along with many of the OECD
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countries. A variety of studies will be reviewed which show the size, scope and effects of
informal economies from all over the world.
The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have shown a thriving informal sector, in
spite of, and possibly because of, the heavy regulation, high taxation, high formal
unemployment rates and, often times, military rule. The informalization view of the
informal economy has been often used as the theoretical lens from which to view the
informal sector of more developed nations. This view has been highly criticized because
of the implications that productive formal labor could be efficiently subcontracted to
informal producers. Meagher (1995) admits to the downfalls of this approach but believes
it may offer a helpful view of the informal economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa. She
believes that this view offers insight into the dynamic characteristics of the informal
sector that is not as pronounced in the formal sector. These dynamics exist due to high
competition, vulnerability and subsistence incomes. However, as the social networks
protect the informal sector from the formal market forces this is at the “expense of high
levels of informal labour exploitation and political vulnerability” (Meagher, 1995).
Meagher also believes that the informal sector develops as “a process of socio-economic
restructuring instigated by the state and various groups within the formal sector...”
Shinder (1997) argues that the informal sector is vital for the growth of
developing nations, in particular Zimbabwe, and asserts that much of the formally
employed should be encouraged to become informal entrepreneurs. At the time of this
study Zimbabwe’s budget deficit was $4.3 billion, unemployment was over 30% and they
were facing deteriorating living standards. Shinder was interested in determining whether
the government should focus on decreasing the size of the informal economy or not. It is
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understood that the informal sector is unregulated, avoids taxes and, at times, participates
in illegal activities. At this time, the formal economy was shrinking and there were signs
of growth in the informal sector. Shinder concludes that any policies aimed at the
informal economy should be done with care. The behavior of informal entrepreneurs and
firms differ greatly by industry. Therefore, Zimbabwe should develop industry specific
policies that would target the sectors where the informal activity is not benefiting society
as a whole and blanket policies that add more regulation to deter informal participation as
a whole should be avoided. For political reasons, this was not the approach Zimbabwe’s
policymakers took and targeted the informal sector in 2005 and by this time, the informal
sector was thought to be the main source of income for Zimbabweans (Coomer &
Gstraunthaler, 2011).
Solomon (2011) aims to examine the impact of public policy on the size of the
informal economy in Nigeria. Just as seen in Zimbabwe, the informal economy plays a
major role in Nigeria, specifically in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors and has
contributed to their growth. High taxes, heavy regulation, high cost of running a formal
operation and the parallel exchange rate market are all reasons for the thriving Nigerian
informal sector (Solomon, 2011). Solomon found that the negative oil-price shock
increased the size of the informal economy. The shock reduced tax revenue which led to
a decrease in government spending. She also asserts that as the government decided to
balance the budget, seigniorage decreases which lowered inflation. Since inflation is in
essence a production tax in the informal sector, the lower inflation led to expansion in the
informal sector.
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Nigeria and Zimbabwe are not the richest countries in Africa, at least as measured
by per capita income. One of the richest, South Africa, has a relatively small informal
sector when compared to economies of its size. This informal activity is concentrated in
agriculture, light manufacturing, and trade/transport services (Davies & Thurlow, 2010).
Crime and poor access to credit are significant barriers to entry in the formal sector in
South Africa. However, unemployment has been a strong concern for South Africa, even
as of late. The South African government has recently battled to get the unemployment
rate under twenty-four percent. Davies & Thurlow (2010) investigate the relationship
between informal-formal linkages and unemployment. They employ a general
equilibrium model and develop a typology that allows them to examine the interaction
between the formal and informal sectors. They define four types of informal
employment: 1) informal producers that have a distinct informal good that pricecompetes with a formal good but there is no wage competition between the formal and
informal workers, 2) informal traders that do not compete with formal producers and still
there is no wage competition, 3) informally employed by the formal sector where there is
wage competition and finally 4) non-competitive informal activities that generate goods
which do not compete with formal sector goods. Their computable general equilibrium
model allows them to model the functioning of the entire economy, including all sectors,
institutions and markets. Conceptually, the linkages that occur between the formal and
informal sectors, in their model, are the informal purchase of formal goods (and vice
versa), informal wage income from the formal sector (this happens often in the
construction and agricultural industries), informal participants borrowing from the formal
economy and social transfers to the informal economy from the government. The model
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is calibrated to the 2002 South African Formal-Informal Sector social accounting matrix.
They find that one of the reasons that the South African informal sector is believed to be
so small is that many estimates do not include informal employment in the formal sector.
They also suggest that the recent liberalization policies of South Africa are widening the
gap between the rich and poor and between the formal and informal sectors.
Development in Latin America has, at times, been characterized by slow formal
economic expansion coupled with rapid economic growth. A large informal sector helps
explain this phenomenon. Portes & Schauffler (1993) review some of the competing
perspectives of the informal economy in Latin America. The article presents different
measurement strategies, as applied to Latin America, and how the results inform public
policy development. Earlier theories of the development of the informal sector in Latin
America focused on the rural to urban immigrant migration that took place in the 1940s
until the 1960s. This migration led to a surplus of labor in urban areas and these migrants
were “forced” to create their own means of income generation (Souza & Tokman, 1976).
This perspective assumes that the immigrants struggled to enter into the formal sector and
were excluded from participating; they were marginalized. It was assumed that these
immigrants were lower class and the settlements they created in the urban areas were
wrought with poverty. However, that was not necessarily the case and this perspective
failed to ignore the millions of successful and rightfully employed immigrants. De Soto
(1989) began to show that the informal economies in Latin American were not
necessarily comprised of marginalized individuals. He asserted that the formal economic
participation was restricted to an elite few and the informal sector expanded as an
alternative. Many of the informal participants were very efficient. They employed many
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family laborers and used very little capital. De Soto, however, did agree that the rural to
urban migrants were the primary informal sector participants.
Do the informal workers in Latin America have to accept lower wages? Or do the
workers see a wage premium for participating in the informal sector and therefore choose
the informal sector over formal employment? Marcouiller et al. (1997) use formal wage
gap measures to determine if in fact a wage gap exists for workers in the informal sectors
when compared to similar workers in the formal sector. They analyzed data from Mexico,
El Salvador and Peru. The results were not the same for all countries. They estimated a
wage premium for participating in the formal sector in El Salvador and Peru but a wage
premium for informal employment in Mexico. This finding supports those who argue that
the informal sector is not a catch all for unskilled, low paid workers who cannot find
employment in the formal sector. They also found that middle-aged individuals are less
likely to be informally employed when compared to older and younger workers and
formal workers are more educated. The informal workers were mostly concentrated in
retail; however, the construction industry included substantial informal activities.
Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America and the second largest in the
western hemisphere. Depending on how you define informal activities, the informal
sector in Brazil has been estimated at 40% to over 60% of its GDP (Henley &
Arabsheibani, 2009). Brazil has opened up its economy to foreign competition and has
stabilized its currency but is still seeing growth in the informal sector. Brazil is highly
bureaucratic and it is very difficult to open a business there, not to mention the three
years that it may take to close it. Therefore, the informal sector thrives throughout the
different economic sectors including construction, transportation, retail and service. Other
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than the often cited bureaucratic hurdles in Brazil, access to credit can also be a barrier to
entry into the formal sector. Though, access to credit is also difficult because of the
bureaucratic hurdles. Aside from the difficulty in accessing credit, there is also a shortage
in the credit that is available to start a formal venture. Formal ventures in Brazil will need
funds just to begin operation due to the complexity of the tax system. Very few business
owners would be able to properly and accurately complete their tax return; therefore,
normally an accountant is paid a monthly salary to assist the business owners.
Microcredit could be a solution that would lessen the barrier to credit and that may be an
effective way to go in Brazil since the informal sector pays a premium price for capital
when compared to the formal sector (de Paula & Scheinkman, 2011).
India is known to have a substantial amount of informal activity and is said to
house more “black money” than the rest of the world combined, as reported by the Swiss
bank. These estimates come from the amount of black money that is held in Swiss banks.
The purpose of transferring or housing money in these types of accounts would be to end
the paper trail of the monies in the home country or country in which business is being
conducted. This black economy emerged in India post World War II because of tax
policies that were created to spur investment and savings but also complicated tax
reporting (Pandey, 2010). Pandey also reports that in India, even highly respected
professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, overcharge their patients and do not provide
them with a receipt. Often times, the charges do not match what is reported on income
statements and the difference between these figures is considered black money. The black
money generated in India is estimated at 40% of their GDP (Pandey, 2010).
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As stated at the beginning of this section, informal activities are not necessarily a
symptom of underdevelopment and inequality. A study by Bajada (1999) aims at
estimating the size of the informal economy in Australia. He rightly notes that a large
informal economy can have substantial policy implications specifically because there is
an asymmetry problem. The government does not have perfect information about
economic transactions and therefore cannot accurately assess their national economic
state. Carter (1984) is one of the earliest studies that begins to discuss the informal sector
in Australia and report that it may as simple as opportunities in the informal sector are
more attractive than formal options. He insinuates that Australians may enjoy the
flexibility, freedom and autonomy of the informal sector and that thriving by
participating in this sector is better than succumbing to the routine and mundane activities
involved in formal employment options. However up until Bajada’s (1999) study, there
was no time series estimation of the size of the informal sector in Australia. Bajada found
recent increases in the size of the informal sector in Australia, which may be caused by
increasing tax rates and welfare benefits. The estimates show that unreported income had
risen to 15% of GDP and given the economic and political atmosphere in Australia, there
was no reason to believe that this rising trend should change. Giving the estimations,
Bajada came to the conclusion that formal sector economic shocks spurred both
substitution (unemployment) and income (changes in income) effects. The income effect
overweighed the substitution effect. Bajada also concluded that the informal sector was
increasing the volatility of the formal sector business cycles.
Pickhardt & Pons (2006) set out to better estimate the size of the informal
economy in Germany. They employ two approaches: the currency demand approach and
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the MIMIC approach. The currency demand approach was covered earlier in the chapter
however the original Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes MIMIC approach was not. The
MIMIC model was first used in the context of the informal sector by Frey & WeckHanneman (1984). This model has two main equations, a measurement and structural
equation. The measurable equation is related to a set of observable variables. The
structural equation includes observables, for example tax burden, unemployment,
inflation, etc., structural parameters and a latent variable. In this case, the latent variable
is the informal sector. Due to the identification condition, the MIMIC model should have
at least one cause with two indicators. The MIMIC approach is very sensitive to the
causes and this is often cited as a criticism for using this model. The results from
Pickhardt & Pons (2006) suggest that the size of the informal sector in Germany
increased from the late 1980s until 2000 and decreased in size in 2001. Much of the
informal sector in Germany can be attributed to taxes, particularly social security tax.
This result lends itself easily to labor policy, which, specifically for Germany, may be an
important policy tool that can, in tandem with fiscal policy, can act to reduce the size of
the informal sector.
In the years 1999 to 2003, the United States was estimated to have a small
percentage of its GDP generated from informal activities, ranging from 8.4% to 8.7%
(Schneider F. , 2004). This may be a low percentage of GDP but since the United States
has the highest GDP out of all countries, the amount of dollars circulating in transactions
taking place outside of the formal sector is staggering. These low percentages are
debatable, of course, and it is difficult to measure the amount of undocumented workers
in the US that are receiving part or all of their income and not reporting this to the federal
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government. This is said to be one of major types of informal problems, so to say, that the
United States faces (Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi, & Ireland, 2012). As is with many
developing countries, informal employment is concentrated among the lower income
classes (Nightingale & Wandner, 2011). It is said that some of the economic slowdowns
faced by the United States were not as severe as originally reported because no informal
activities were included in those measures. For example, claims that the slowdown from
1970-89 was highly overstated because during this period the informal sector in the
United States was expanding rapidly (Fichtenbaum, 1989). Along with undocumented
workers’ income, the U.S. currency finds itself often involved in informal transactions. It
is estimated that over US$2 trillion goes unreported every year and that 18% - 23% of
total reported income is not properly reported to the IRS (Feige, 2012).
Tax evasion and entrepreneurship
One possible motivation for choosing entrepreneurship over wage-earning
employment is the ease of evading taxes, as noted by Andreoni et. al. (1998). An
entrepreneur, especially a self-employed, sole proprietor can underreport income and
overstate deductions more easily than someone employed as a wage-earner. If the
perceived probability of being caught is low and the penalty for underreporting is low
then an entrepreneur may choose to risk underreporting if they can avoid paying the taxes
on the income. If entrepreneurs behaved in this manner then one would believe that lower
taxes could increase self-employment levels. Fölster utilized data from OECD countries
and found that national tax burden and self-employment as a percentage of GDP were
negatively related. It is difficult to determine if this actually supports the case where
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entrepreneurs choose to become so to avoid taxes. The tax variable was not precise
enough to determine their effects on self-employment.
Parker and Robson (2004) also examined OECD data, specifically from 1972 to
1996, to determine what explains international differences in rates of self-employments.
The cross country analysis provided an interesting comparison between countries and the
panel dataset allowed the researchers to examine the countries over time. The authors
showed how multiple explanatory variables cointegrated with the self-employment
variable. The results suggested that average income tax rates and self-employment rates
are positively and significantly related. These findings supported an early study by
Robson & Wren (1999). Taken at face value, the implications of such studies are that as
individuals face higher tax rates they are more likely to enter into self-employment. This
study offers more specifics about which taxes may be related to self-employment when
compare to Fölster’s study. However, the cross country macro level data sets, such as the
OECD have many weaknesses. For example, reporting methods are not standardized
throughout the member countries. Therefore, an individual that is categorized as selfemployed in one country may not be categorized as such in another. Torrini (2005) also
used OECD data to take a closer look at the relationship between public policy and selfemployment. One of the results is that unemployment benefits are negatively related to
self-employment, which suggests that unemployed workers with high benefit rates have
little incentive to start their own business. However, these results were sensitive to model
specifications.
Donald Bruce (2000) investigated the dynamics of the U.S. tax system and
individuals’ choice of self-employment. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics provided a
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good panel of U.S. data and his data set covered 1970 through 1991. The author was
interested in determining the benefit that a self-employed person gains from being noncompliant. Differential taxes, specifically between wage-earning and the self-employed,
were a focus of the study. Bruce computed the tax differentials for the transition from
wage-earning into self-employment. The findings suggest that higher tax differentials led
to a reduction in entry into self-employment. However, Bruce does not suggest that
entrepreneurs choose to do so to avoid paying higher taxes. One implication of the study
is that higher marginal tax rates for the self-employed could be associated with more
deductions for filing as a business. Therefore, the higher marginal tax rates increase the
benefits for the self-employed.
A further step in being able to tailor policies which create disincentives for tax
evasion by the self-employed is to understand which of the self-employed are more likely
to evade taxes. This information gives policymakers power to create specific policies that
will focus on the sector of the population that are intended to be affected by the policy.
Schuetze (2002) conducted a study that mainly focused on the demographic differences
among the self-employed and which were more likely to be non-compliant. The data was
collected from the Canadian Family Expenditure Surveys and covered the time span of
1969 to 1992. One major finding of the study is that those who were self-employed in the
construction industry were more likely to be non-compliant, which may be due to the
ease of underreporting in such industries. The construction industry was followed closely
by service industries. Another interesting finding is that the level of non-compliance
decreases with age. Also households that were headed by two self-employed individuals
(as opposed to one) concealed less income.
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Tax evasion is one of the manners in which individuals can participate in the
informal economy. In the U.S., unreported or underreported income is a major source of
informal activities. The ease of tax evasion is often associated with the decision to
become self-employed. The model presented below begins to investigate the effects of
tax evasion throughout the economy. It is important to note that no distinction is made
between entrepreneurs, the self-employed and other wage-earners or agents in the model.
The majority of literature reviewed at the beginning of the chapter has covered the
informal economy at the macro level throughout the world. However, the model below
does not give specific insight into the details of the informal economy; it only looks at the
effects of one type informal activity, tax evasion. The review here was an opportunity to
present a picture of the widely explored informal sectors and how they can be an inhibitor
of or contributor to growth. In the model below, growth is not explained by the model
and is taken as a given parameter that is based on the growth of productivity. Take the
model below as a beginning to the theoretical investigation of informal activities and how
the effects are felt throughout the economy. Many extensions of the model can be
developed to include the differences between: entrepreneurs and wage-earners, informal
and formal producers; and informal and formal entrepreneurs.
Model
The model below is an extension of the Ramsey model by including an income
tax and the ability for an agent to evade this tax. The ability to more easily evade taxes is
an often cited reason that individuals choose to become self-employed. This model
specifically focuses how an income and tax evasion is felt throughout the economy. The
model includes representative agents and firms interacting in a marketplace.
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The Agent’s Problem
First, representative agents maximize the constant relative risk aversion utility
function below. For simplicity, utility is only a function of consumption.

is total

consumption by a representative agent at time t.
(1)
The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for this functional form is equal to ,
which is a constant, hence the name of this functional form. σ = 1/

is the elasticity of

substitution between consumption in the present and consumption in the future. In this
model, no differentiation is made between a wage-earner and an entrepreneur. To
maximize utility, an agent solves the problem below.

∫

(2)

s.t.

̇

The first constraint shows how an agent’s assets,
discount rate

, accumulate over time.

is the wages an agent earns from labor.

is the interest earned on assets.

is the dilution of assets due to population growth. Therefore,
income of a representative agent.
model.

is the

is the

is the income tax rate faced by all agents in the

is the amount of taxes which an agent evades, 0 >

parameter represents a higher level of tax evasion. As

> 1. A lower value for this

approaches one, an agent is

paying more of the tax rate and as it approaches zero an agent is paying less. This shows
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that a high level of tax evasion leads to more income for the agent.

can be directly

affected by government policy. For example, as penalties for being caught evading taxes
increases an agent is more likely to evade a lower amount of taxes. If the probability of
being caught increases then an agent is again more likely to evade a lower amount of
taxes.
The second constraint shows that an agent starts with a given asset level at time
zero. The third condition constrains an agent from running a Ponzi scheme. This
condition maintains that at a given point in time an agent can no longer borrow. The final
constraint restricts consumption levels to be positive at all times. To solve the
maximization problem, the Hamiltonian equation below is used.
(3)
is the marginal value of an agent’s assets at time t. An agent’s utility would increase
by

if they had one more unit of assets. The Hamiltonian,

, is the utility level,

received from income, of a given agent at time t. The agent receives utility from their
consumption in the present and receives future utility from their current savings. After
first differentiating the Hamiltonian, the first order conditions (FOCs) below become
evident.

⁄
⁄

(4)

⁄

̇

(5)

̇

(6)
(7)
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The transversality condition (TVC) keeps the system stable and forces that as times
approaches infinity either the marginal value of assets or the level assets (or both) must
be equal to zero. Now, equations (4) and (5) can be used to derive the “Euler Equation.”
After logging and differentiating (4), equation (8) is the result.
̇

̇

(8)

And by rearranging (5), a different representation of

̇

is found and represented in

equation (9).
̇

(9)

Setting (8) and (9) equal gives the “Euler Equation” seen in equation (10).
̇

(10)

There are two opposing forces on consumption for this agent. The agent is impatient and
would rather consume today than save, however, the positive interest rate incentivizes the
agent to save (invest) now to be able to consume even more in the future. Also, notice
that if the interest rate exactly equals the discount rate then the agent will save just
enough to keep consumption levels constant over time. If the interest rate is greater than
the discount rate then the agent receives a higher reward for saving and therefore the
agent consumes less today so they can consume more tomorrow. On the other hand, if the
reward to saving is less then the agent will consume more today and consumption will
decrease over time. The agent also has to choose whether to participate in informal
activities by choosing how much tax to evade.
With equation (10) and our restraint on asset accumulation, there are two
differential equations for consumption and assets, show in equations (11) and (12).
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̇

(11)

̇

(12)

However, the phase diagrams cannot be drawn because wages and returns to investing in
assets are determined in the marketplace and therefore the behavior of firms needs to be
examined. Notice that when adding income tax rate and the ability to evade taxes to the
model the agent now does not care about the interest rate on investments; he or she is
more interested in the “after-tax” interest rate, which is the rate they will actually receive
on their investments. This after-tax rate is dependent not only on the tax rate but also on
the level of tax evasion.
The Firm’s Problem
The firm’s maximization problem, including productivity growth,

, is seen

below. As is normally assumed, the productivity growth is associated with more
productive labor. Even if capital is becoming more advanced, the laborers will become
more productive by utilizing the more sophisticated capital. A future version of this
model could be developed by differentiating between types of producers. For example,
producers in this model could be only entrepreneurs, which have the choice to participate
either in the formal or informal economy, or a combination of the two. The production
function below is a function of capital,

, and labor productivity,

.
(13)

s.t.

The first order conditions here will represent the marginal product of capital, equation
(14), and the marginal product of labor, equation (15). The marginal product of capital
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equals the rents paid on the capital and the marginal product of labor is equal to the
wages.
(14)
(15)
In intensive form the first order conditions are as follows.
(14’)
(15’)
Agent’s Solutions

̇

(11)

̇

(12)
(7)
(19)

Firm’s Solutions
(14’)
(15’)
Market Clearing Conditions
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
Equation (20) restricts the labor market to equal population in the model.
Equation (21) shows that the banks hold all of the agents’ assets and rents the capital to
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entrepreneurs.

is the depreciation rate of capital. Therefore, equation (22) shows that a

competitive bank makes zero profits, assuming constant returns to scale. Equation (23) is
the government’s budget constraint. It holds by definition. It just says that

is the

revenue the government will collect given this income tax rate. Notice that it is dependent
on the level of tax evasion. If a representative agent evades a high level of taxes then the
government has lower income. Therefore, the government, in this model, should work to
deter agents from evading taxes. This could be done by higher penalties or a ensuring a
higher probability of being caught.
Combining equations (11), (14’) and (21) gives equation (24), which is a
representation of the change in consumption over time. Notice that this representation
will not include prices. This equation is more easily presented in a phase diagram. Also,
combining equations (12), (14’), (15’), (20), (21) and (22) gives us a similar, price-free
representation of the change in capital over time, seen in equation (25).

̇

(24)

̇

(25)

Now that prices are gone, the equations are one step closer to being able to be displayed
in a phase diagram. The only part of the equations that keep this from happening is the
growth in productivity. This variable is changing over time; therefore the two sets of
equations are not yet autonomous. To derive the necessary equations, new variables are
defined below.
̇

̂̇
̂̇

̇

̂

(26)

̂

(27)
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̇

. Therefore, the system of differential equations can be seen in equations (28) and

(29).

̇̂
̂̇

̂

̂

[
[ (̂ )

̂ ]
̂

]

(28)

̂

(29)

A phase diagram can now be drawn for these two equations, shown in Figure 1. The
interest for this chapter lies in the level of tax evasion and its effects throughout the
economy. For comparative purposes, a baseline, indexed with a B on the graph, level of
tax evasion is assumed and then this level is increased. The increased level of evasion is
indexed with an H. This allows for the model to show how an increase in the level of
evasion affects the economy. The tax rate faced by agents in this model is assumed to be
constant throughout the analysis. The isocline for the increased level of evasion is rotated
downward when compared to the isocline of the baseline level of tax evasion. Due to this
difference between the isoclines, the higher level of tax evasion leads to lower steadystate levels of capital and consumption.
To see the effects of an increase in tax evasion on capital and consumption levels
over time it is useful to take a look at the time paths for these two variables. At the
baseline level of tax evasion, the economy is in a steady state. There are two effects at
play here, the substitution and income effects. The substitution effect is evident when a
lower level of tax evasion leads to a decrease in an agent’s return on savings, therefore it
is more worthwhile to consume today. But the income effect is leading to a different
outcome, where the lower level of evasion leads to the agent becoming poorer therefore
they are forced to consume less today. To be able to draw the time paths, one of the
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Figure 1. Phase Diagram
̂

̂̇
̂̇

̂
̂
̂
̂

̂

̂

̂̇

̂̇

̂

effects has to dominate. Moving forward, the substitution effect overrides the income
effect. Therefore, ̂

̂ . Before the time paths for capital and consumption can be

drawn, one final illustration must be made. Remember ̂
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, therefore

̂ and after

logging and differentiating this representation of capital it can be seen that Equation (30)
shows that
̇

̂̇
̂

̇

̂

(30)
when ̂ is at its steady-state level, when ̂

̂ , the economy never stops accumulating

capital. And this growth in capital is exactly equal to productivity growth. The same
analysis can be done for consumption and the results tell the same story,
Figures 2 and 3 for the time paths of capital and consumption respectively.
Figure 2. Time Path of Capital
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̂

. See

Figure 3. Time Path of Consumption

The results seen in the time paths show that the tax evasion activities do not affect
the long term growth rate, which is only dependent on productivity growth. A higher rate
of tax evasion leads to a lower level of capital per worker and, since the substitution
effect outweighs the income effect, tax evasion leads to lower levels of consumption. No
assumptions are made here as to what the agents will do with the income that they save
from evading taxes.
How does this affect government revenue? Remember that government revenue is
represented by the equation below. As the level of tax evasion increases,
amount of government revenue decreases. Remember,
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, the
, and define,

just as before ̂

. Now by looking at the phase diagram above it is easy to see the

difference in government revenue due to tax evasion activities, ̂ .
It is important to note that the previous model is only the beginning of the
theoretical investigation of informal activities. The Ramsey model, and its possible
extensions, offers a variety of ways to investigate the informal economy. For example, a
functional form for the production function could be assumed. Also, the production
function for formal production and informal production could be different and a producer
would have to choose the output level that would maximize his or her profits. Producers
in the models could also be assumed only to be entrepreneurs. Those types of extensions
are future avenues of research.
Conclusion
All economies in the world face some level of informal activities, even those that
have been historically considered ideal economic environments. It does not matter
whether an economy is experiencing high rates of growth and is among the most
developed in the world or if the economy is facing stagnant growth rates and is
considered to be underdeveloped. There is no clear picture as to whether informal
activities are indicators of a flourishing entrepreneurial environment or if it is a sign of an
overly bureaucratic system. More often than not governments attempt to reduce the
amount of informal economic activity that is happening in their economy. However, if
that is the case and at the same time entrepreneurs and self-employed choose to be so to
evade taxes then the government is working against the potential entrepreneurs in the
economy. It is important to know, however not included in this model, what a tax evader
does with the extra income that they saved from evading taxes. The model here gives a
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simple look at the effects of tax evasion throughout the economy. One of the most
obvious results is that as the level of tax evasion increases, government revenue
decreases. The model also shows that investment into capital and levels of consumption
will decrease as more taxes are evaded. However, the long term growth rate of the
economy remains unchanged as a result of tax evasion. A possible extension of the model
is to include assumptions about how agents use the money they save from evading taxes.
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CONCLUSION
Encouraging entrepreneurship is only one of the focuses for policy makers but for
long-term, sustainable growth, it should be considered an important one. As economists,
we are tasked with analyzing policies, among other duties. Policy analysis and assistance
in policy development are especially crucial when deciding how a nation can support
entrepreneurial activities and the growth and development of the small business sector.
The small business sector is an important provider of middle class jobs and creates
competitive markets that drive down prices for consumers and offer them more choices
on the marketplace. A healthy middle class can ensure healthy economic growth and low
unemployment rates. This dissertation focuses on three distinct approaches to informing
policymakers on the behavior of potential entrepreneurs and how they respond to policy
changes.
The first approach as outlined in the first chapter is to take an existing policy and
determine if it has affected the behavior of individuals in the manner that it set out to do.
The benefits of this type of approach are that the unintended effects of the policies can be
ignored and the difference-in-difference model allows for the isolation of the effects of
the policies on a very specific group of people. State level policy makers wanted to
develop a policy that would increase the take-up rate for insurance by subsidizing the
costs. A major focus of all of the state level policies was to specifically cut the costs of
health insurance for the self-employed, small business owners and those who are
employed by small businesses. The analysis laid out in chapter one focused on the effects
of the policies on the self-employed, which make up a large percentage of the uninsured.
The results showed that the subsidies did increase the take-up rate among the self-
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employed. This makes self-employment more attractive and is a very effective way of
rewarding those who take the risk to become self-employed. Another possible effect of
the policy could have been that it encouraged more people to choose self-employment
over wage earning but the results did not support this. This is only one example of how a
well-designed policy scheme can build the confidence of the self-employed and show
them a sign that they are important members of society. This increase in take-up rates can
lower healthcare costs because fewer people would use emergency services, which drives
up costs. More individuals would see primary care physicians. This type of analysis is
very important to the recent changes in the healthcare market as a whole. It gives policy
makers a look at how certain policy designs have had the intended effects on individuals’
behavior.
Unfortunately, not all policies have the intended effects and therefore, economist
and other social and political scientists must work to advise policymakers while policies
are being devised and considered. That is where chapter two attempts to come into play.
The focus was to determine if there was a difference in the behavior of different groups
of people. Policies are derived to encourage or discourage certain behaviors and isolating
the effects of policies on specific groups of people is difficult without clear, personal
level data to inform these decisions. One of the most effective ways to gather such data is
by conducting an experiment. The second chapter offers information about the risk taking
preferences among more and less entrepreneurial individuals. It is often assumed that
entrepreneurs are by nature less risk averse but that is not necessarily the case. It may be
that entrepreneurs believe that they may face more risk if he or she puts the control of his
or her income in the hands of others but controlling it himself or herself is less risky. The
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experiment investigated college students in the U.S. and Brazil to determine if there were
differences in the groups’ risk taking preferences. Weak support was found for the case
that more entrepreneurial subjects were more financially risky than less entrepreneurial
subjects. This was probably due to a low sample size. However, it gives a great starting
point for investigating this possibility using experimental economics, which had not been
done in the past. And with more funding, this study could easily be extended and
replicated. One possible extension to the study would be to not use the survey tool to
categorize individuals as more or less entrepreneurial but to have actual entrepreneurs
and non-entrepreneurs take part in the experiment and determine if there is a fundamental
difference in the behavior between the two groups.
A final way in which economists can help inform policy makers is through the
development and testing of economic theories. As economists are often touted for
simplifying the world with their theories and depiction of the world in a way that is too
far from reality, many of the predictions of theoretical models have gained empirical
support. One of the main points of theoretical exercises is the critical thinking behind the
model development. The critical thinking often leads to future research questions,
rethinking of assumptions and constructive criticism of existing models. These thought
experiments, backed by the power of mathematics, allow economists to predict behavior
and effects of economic changes on the economy as a whole. The ability to change
parameters in a model and then trace out the effects offers powerful insights into the
functioning of an economy.
The final chapter uses theoretical economics, specifically the Ramsey model, to
investigate the effects of tax evasion on the economy as a whole. Of course, one of the
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obvious effects is the decrease in government revenue as the level of tax evasion
increases. It is quite convenient when economic theory supports intuitive reasoning and
there is no less value in the model if it aligns with the intuition. One of the purposes of
the theoretical models is to answer the questions as to why our intuition leads us to
believe in certain happenings. Answering the “why” questions is very powerful for policy
makers and they can easily access this information. One other interesting prediction of
the model is that tax evasion does not affect the long-term growth rate of an economy,
only productivity growth affects the growth rate.
This dissertation offers a very brief look into three of the ways in which
economists can determine the effects of policies on the behavior of entrepreneurs. As
noted, it is important to evaluate current policies, inform the development of policies
using individual level data and also taking theoretical look at economic phenomenon.
This is only the beginning of the research that can come out of thinking about the
economics of entrepreneurship in this way and hopefully this will lead to more critical
thinking on the topic. It is of high value to continue to inform policy on how important
entrepreneurship is for economic growth and how these types of ventures can be healthily
supported.
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APPENDIX
Table 1A. Comparative Stats for Control (C) and Treatment (T) States by Industry GDP as a Percentage of State GDP
State
Arizona (T)
Colorado (C)
Kentucky (T)
West Virginia (C)
Maine (T)
Ohio (C)
New Mexico (T)
Nevada (C)
Maryland (T)
New Jersey (C)
Massachusetts (T)
Rhode Island (C)
Montana (T)
North Dakota (C)
Tennessee (T)
Alabama (C)

Region
West
West
South
South
NW
Midwest
West
West
South
NE
NE
NE
West
Midwest
South
South

Median
Income
57,855
68,943
49,801
47,659
56,566
57,360
51,994
60,829
84,254
83,381
81,033
69,350
55,010
63,507
51,344
50,779

Ag/For/Fish*
0.64%
0.82%
1.37%
0.34%
N/A
0.56%
1.45%
0.21%
0.25%
0.16%
0.22%
0.17%
3.23%
8.43%
0.57%
1.21%

Mining Utilities
1.69%
2.29%
3.88%
1.36%
2.39%
1.91%
10.30% 3.05%
N/A
1.78%
0.39%
2.05%
6.71%
1.96%
3.41%
1.85%
0.04%
2.10%
0.01%
1.66%
0.04%
1.46%
0.08%
1.82%
4.64%
2.93%
3.07%
2.74%
0.11%
0.72%
1.53%
2.97%

CNST
5.55%
4.56%
4.02%
4.35%
3.84%
3.29%
5.16%
7.51%
4.93%
3.38%
3.37%
4.41%
5.63%
4.55%
3.31%
4.42%

Mftg* Finance Retail Trans*
7.75%
7.69% 2.65% 8.50%
6.98%
5.52% 2.51% 6.65%
16.21% 6.30% 4.56% 5.55%
8.85%
7.13% 3.01% 4.68%
10.39% 8.47% 2.37% 7.58%
15.60% 6.42% 3.10% 9.60%
5.30%
6.61% 2.56% 4.01%
4.12%
6.43% 3.44% 9.56%
5.30%
5.45% 1.88% 6.20%
7.99%
5.89% 2.91% 8.83%
8.88%
4.52% 1.55% 11.10%
8.09%
5.39% 1.44% 12.13%
5.57%
6.68% 4.37% 5.48%
8.61%
6.40% 4.31% 6.76%
14.27% 7.54% 4.74% 7.06%
15.76% 7.23% 2.73% 5.73%

R.E.*
15.36%
13.32%
9.21%
9.41%
14.02%
11.14%
11.93%
13.71%
16.85%
17.36%
14.39%
15.07%
12.18%
10.87%
10.80%
9.93%

*Ag/For/Fish represents agriculture, forestry fishing and hunting. CNST represents construction Mftg represents manufacturing. Trans represents
transportation. R.E. represents real estate. Professional services represents professional services.
Data sources: U.S. Census Bureau, 2009 American Community Survey and 2009 Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
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P.S.*
5.95%
9.61%
4.40%
3.92%
5.22%
6.03%
8.83%
4.96%
10.84%
9.32%
11.89%
5.68%
5.10%
3.41%
6.06%
6.56%

Table 2A. Conversion from Education Attainment to Years
Highest level of attainment reported
Less than 1st grade
1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade
5th or 6th grade
7th or 8th grade
9th grade
10th grade
11th grade
12th grade no diploma
High school grad, diploma or equivalent
Some college but no degree
Associate degree in college--occupation/vocation program
Associate degree in college--academic program
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree
Professional school degree
Doctorate degree
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Conversion to years
0
2.5
5.5
7.5
9
10
11
12
12
13
14
14
16
18
21
21

Exhibit 1 Recruitment Script
Your voluntary participation is being requested for an experiment in the Economics
Department. The study is interested in finding more information about financial and
economic risk decisions. You will be paid $10 for participating with the opportunity to
leave with more or less than that amount. You could leave the experiment with up to $40.
The experiment will last around one and a half hours. To be eligible, you must be a
student at UNM and be at least 18 years of age. If you have questions or are interested in
participating then please contact Dennis Barber III at dbarber3@unm.edu.
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Exhibit 2 Experimental Script
ALL NON-ITALISIZED TEXT WAS SPOKEN. This script began after we reviewed the
consent form and it was signed by each student.
Welcome to this study. Thank you for participating.
Each student will be seated at a desk with a study packet in front of them. This will
include an envelope containing 10 one dollar bills, the 21 question survey and an
envelope that they will use for the first round of investments.
Each of you have in front of you a study packet made up of an envelope containing 10
one dollar bills, a 21 question survey and another empty envelope. The ten dollar is your
payment for completing the 21 question survey. However, at this time, do not remove this
money from the envelope. Please complete the survey and pay close attention to the
answers for each question. After you have completed the survey please sit quietly and
wait for further instructions. Make sure you do not skip any questions on the survey. Are
there any questions?
Time was given for them to complete the survey.
I will now come by and collect the surveys. I will soon explain what the empty envelope
will be used for once I have collected all of the surveys.
The survey was then collected and each student was asked to remove the blank envelope
in their study packet in which they will place their investment for the first round of
investments.
You will now be asked to make a decision. You will decide how much money to invest in
a risky asset. There is a 60% chance that you will earn more money if you invest in this
asset and a 40% chance that you will lose the money invested in this asset. You can
invest any or all of the ten dollars that you received for completing the survey. Whether
you win or not will be determined by each of you drawing a card. I have here ten cards,
the ace of spades, which we will call one, through the 10 of spades. If you draw a one,
two, three, four, five or six then you will keep your investment and will gain an amount
equal to that which you invested. If you draw a seven, eight, nine or ten then you will
lose only what you invested. This gives you a sixty percent chance of gaining from your
investment. For example, if you invest five dollars and draw a one through six then you
will win five additional dollars. However, if you draw a seven through ten then you will
lose only the five dollars that you invested.

122

You received an empty envelope. Without talking to anyone around you, please decide
how much of your ten dollars you would want to invest and place that amount inside the
empty envelope. Then wait for further instructions. Are there any questions?
Once everyone had decided, I went around to each person and shuffled the cards. They
then chose a card from the stack. This determined if they had a gain or loss from their
investment.
I am going to walk around the room to each of you individually. Please choose a card
from this stack. If you draw a one through six then you will double your investment. If
you draw a seven through ten then you will lose only what you invested. As they win or
lose, I marked that on the front of the envelope and collected them one by one. Then my
trusty assistant will take your envelopes in the back room. If you won then your envelope
will be returned with your investment plus an additional amount equal to your
investment. For example, if your envelope contains five dollars then it will be returned
with ten. If you lost then you will receive an empty envelope. Please do not look at your
neighbors’ investments and do not share your results with them. Are there any questions?
All of the envelopes were then be collected and we took them into the other room. There
we recorded the results from the first round and either added or took money from the
subjects’ envelopes. We then brought out the envelopes and give them to the students.
Attached to each envelope was another empty envelope that had their study ID already
recorded.
I will now pass back the envelopes with your gains or losses from the investment choices
that you made. You will also be given another empty envelope that looks very similar to
your first.
You now have the opportunity to invest in the same asset again. You will be able to
invest any or all of your initial dollars and any or all of your gains from the first
investment. The outcome will be determined in the same manner as before with a sixty
percent chance of gaining from your investment. I will shuffle the same ten cards and you
will draw one card from the stack. If you draw a one through six then you will gain from
your investment at the same rate as before and if you lose then you will lose only what
you invested.
If you won then your envelope will be returned with your investment plus an additional
amount equal to your investment. For example, if your envelope contains five dollars
then it will be returned with ten. If you lost then you will receive an empty envelope.
Please do not look at your neighbors’ investments and do not share your results with
them. Are there any questions?
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All of the envelopes were collected and we again took them into the other room. There we
recorded the results from the second round and either added or took money from the
subjects’ envelopes. We then brought out the envelopes and give them to the students. We
also filled out receipts for each study ID as we gathered the data. The receipts were given
with the second round winnings.
Here are your gains and/or losses from the second investment. Please take your gains
from the envelope. You will now all receive a receipt for your gains. I will come by each
desk and give you each a receipt. Please verify and sign your receipt. What money you
have now is yours to keep.
As I went by each person individually…
Please take a look at this receipt and verify that the information is correct by signing here.
Please fill out the information on the receipt. Thank you for participating in this study.
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Exhibit 3 Survey Tool
All questions were answered on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is “strongly disagree” and
10 was “strongly agree”.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

I often approach business tasks in unique ways.
I enjoy being the catalyst for change in business affairs.
I believe that when pursuing business goals or objectives, the final result is far more important than
following accepted procedures.
I don't hesitate to take control in unstructured situations.
I enjoy being able to use old business concepts in new ways.
It is important to continually look for new ways to do things in business.
I believe that in order to succeed, one must conform in accepted business practices.
I've often created the business opportunities I have taken advantage of.
I am ultimately responsible for my own business success.
My knack for dealing with people has enabled me to create many of my business opportunities.
It is exciting to aggressively pursue business opportunities.
I get a sense of accomplishment from the pursuit of my business opportunities.
I believe it is more important to think about future possibilities than past accomplishments.
I feel real satisfaction when my work is among the best there is.
I often sacrifice in order to take advantage of business opportunities.
I never put important matters off until a more convenient time.
I feel very self-conscious when making business proposals.
I feel uncomfortable when I'm unsure of what my business associates think of me.
I spend a lot of time looking for someone who can tell me how to solve all my business problems.
I always try to make friends with people who may be useful in my business.
I feel self-conscious when I am with very successful business people.

The questions associated with each subscale score are:
Innovation—1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7
Achievement—12, 13, 14, 15 and 16
Personal Control—4, 8, 9, 10 and 11
Self-Esteem—17, 18, 19, 20 and 21
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